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COMMENTS
Civil Procedure-A FEDERAL EMPLOYEE HAS THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN
AN ACTION AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINA-
TION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT-Nakshian v. Claytor, 628 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1980).*
In enacting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), I
Congress failed to say whether a plaintiff bringing suit under the ADEA was
entitled to ajury trial. The courts of appeals interpreting the ADEA2 differed in
their views as to whether Congress intended to grant the right to a jury trial
under section 626 of the ADEA, 3 authorizing suits against private employers.
The Supreme Court of the United States was consequently forced to speak
and, in Lorillard v. Pons, 4 announced that Congress did intend plaintiffs to enjoy
the right to a jury trial in ADEA suits against private employers. 5
Unfortunately, the problem in Lorillard has been resurrected. In 19746
Congress enacted section 633a, 7 which extended ADEA coverage to actions by
federal employees against the federal government 8 but again failed to authorize
expressly the right to a jury trial. The language of section 633a is identical to
that of section 6269 in establishing the manner of enforcement, but does not
specify whether a jury right exists under the amendment. The question of the
right to a jury trial under section 633a arose in Nakshian v. Claytor. 0 In a two to
one decision," the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that federal employees have the right to a jury trial in federal
ADEA actions.1 2
Alice Nakshian was a 62-year-old employee of the United States Navy.
After working for the Navy for over thirty years, Mrs. Nakshian sued her
employer under the ADEA, alleging that she had been the victim of age
discrimination. 13 When Mrs. Nakshian requested ajury trial the Government
* Cert. granted, Hidalgo v. Nakshian, 49 U.S.L.W. 3409 (Dec. 2, 1980).
1 29 U.S.C. 5§ 621-34 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
2 Compare Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F. 2d 682 (6th Cir. 1976) (no jury right), (,acaed and remanded,
434 U.S. 911 (1978), with Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1977) (jury right), aft'd, 434 U.S. 575
(1978), andRogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977) (jury right), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978).
3 29 U.S.C. 5 626 (c) (1976) provides in relevant part: "Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action
in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this
chapter ......
4 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
5 Id. at 585. ADEA actions against private employers will henceforth be referred to as private ADEA
actions.
6 See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (amending 29
U.S.C. § 206 (1970)).
7 Id. 5 28 (b) (2) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1976)). Section 633a(c) authorizes federal suits to en-
force the ADEA and provides: "Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any Federal district court
of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter."
8 ADEA actions against federal employers will henceforth be referred to as federal ADEA actions.
9 See notes 3 and 7 supra.
10 628 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
11 Chief Judge Wright, joined by Judge Bazelon, wrote for the majority. Judge Tamm dissented.
12 Only two other courts have considered the right to ajury trial in a federal ADEA action. Both federal
district courts denied the jury right. See Edmondson v. Simon, No. 76-4591 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 26, 1980);
Huber v. Marshall, No. 78-1104 (D.D.C., Feb. 22, 1979).
13 628 F.2d at 60.
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moved to strike the request, contending that Congress, in waiving sovereign
immunity, had to authorize expressly the right to ajury trial before such a right
could exist."4
In denying the Government's motion and granting the jury request,1 5 the
District Court for the District of Columbia suggested that its decision was
merely an extension of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lorillard. 1 6 The
district court noted that the "exact same" language was used to authorize
federal ADEA actions in section 633a(c) as had been used in section 626(c) to
authorize private ADEA actions.1 7 The court concluded that the language
identical to both sections-particularly the term "legal or equitable
relief" 18-was intended by Congress to mean the same thing in both sections. 19
The court stated that it was unwilling "to deprive plaintiffs who sue govern-
ment entities instead of private employers of their right to a jury trial without
Congress' explicit refusal to grant such a right.' '20 The court then certified the
issue for interlocutory appeal.
The District of Columbia Circuit faced two issues on appeal: (1) whether
Congress must expressly provide for the right to a jury trial when it waives the
federal government's sovereign immunity to unconsented suits, 21 and (2)
assuming that the right to a jury trial need not be explicit, whether the
language and legislative history of the ADEA indicated a congressional intent
to grant the right to a jury trial in federal ADEA actions. 22 Writing for the
court, Chief Judge Wright affirmed the plaintiff's right to a jury trial.23 He
agreed with both parties that Congress, in waiving sovereign immunity and
consenting to suit, "can specify the procedures to be followed, including
whether the case is to be tried to a jury or to the court.'"24 Nevertheless, the
Chief Judge declared that no "automatic presumption" arises against jury
trials when Congress waives sovereign immunity without specifying the pro-
cedures to be followed in the ensuing suits. 25 The contrary view that a jury
right cannot be implied, he stated, results from a misunderstanding of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity.26 When Congress consents to suit it completely
removes all sovereign immunity. Proper trial procedures must therefore be
found in the statute and the "available indicia of legislative intent .... ",27
The majority opinion found sufficient evidence indicating a congressional
14 Id.
15 See Nakshian v. Claytor, 481 F. Supp. 159 (D.D.C. 1979). Judge Oberdorfer wrote the memoran-
dum opinion.
16 434 U.S. 575 (1978). In the district court opinion in Nakshian v. Claytor, Judge Oberdorfer wrote that
an "application of the Lorillard Court's reasoning suggests that a jury trial right exists for suits against the
government." 481 F. Supp. at 160.
17 481 F. Supp. at 160. See notes 3 and 7 supra.
18 "Legal or equitable relief" will henceforth be referred to as "legal... relief."
19 481 F. Supp. at 161.
20 Id.
21 628 F.2d at 62.
22 Id. at 63.
23 Id. at 65.
24 Id. at 62-63.
25 Id. at 63.
26 ChiefJudge Wright focused on the Government's argument that there is a traditional sovereign im-
munity from jury trials which can only be waived expressly. Id. at 61.
27 Id. at 63 n.4. Regarding how Congress could authorize trial procedures, see 9 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5 2314 (1971) ("there is a right to ajury trial only if a statute,
expressly or by fair implication so provides") (footnote omitted).
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intent to allow jury trials in federal ADEA actions. The court noted that "the
very fact that Congress gave jurisdiction over ADEA suits against the federal
government to the [d]istrict [c]ourts rather than the Court of Claims supports
the inference that there is a right to jury trial in such cases.' '28 The court cited
United States v. Pfitsch, 29 in which the Supreme Court noted that an intent to
provide for jury trials can be inferred when Congress confers jurisdiction in the
district courts over actions against the federal government. 30 The court further
noted that Congress must have known that the term "legal" relief, which it
used in sections 626(c) and 633a(c) of the ADEA, 31 had consistently been held
to grant the right to a jury trial where the seventh amendment is applicable. 32
The court declared that even though the seventh amendment 33 was inap-
plicable in Nakshian, 34 Congress had the power to place federal ADEA actions
within the class of suits to which the seventh amendment applied. 35
Finally, the court stated that in amending section 626(c) to provide ex-
pressly for the right to a jury trial,36 Congress was "merely acting to reaffirm
its intention to provide for jury trial whenever the issue was in doubt.' ' 3 7 In
merely squelching doubt, Congress did not intend to distinguish between
private and federal ADEA actions. 38 The court therefore dismissed the absence
of a parallel amendment to section 633a(c) on the ground that no such amend-
ment was necessary.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Tamm rejected the majority's finding of
congressional intent to grant a jury right in federal ADEA actions. Reviewing
the 1974 amendments extending FLSA and ADEA protection to federal
employees, 39 the dissent observed that even though the amendments granted
federal employees the same protection against age discrimination as private
28 Id. at 1238. See5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.31[2] (2ded. rev. 1979); WRIGHT&MILLER, Supra
note 27, at S 2314 n.43 (1971).
29 256 U.S. 547 (1921). See also Law v. United States, 266 U.S. 494 (1925).
30 256 U.S. at 549, 552 (dictum). See notes 47-48 infra and accompanying text.
31 See notes 3 and 7 supra.
32 See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); Pernell v. Southall
Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531
(1970).
See also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978). In Lorillard Justice Marshall, writing for the
unanimous Court, declared that Congress is presumed to know the meaning of the term "legal" and to have
incorporated that meaning absent an obvious intent to give the term a different meaning. The Court saw no
such intent in the ADEA. See also Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911) ("where words are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this coun-
try they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary").
33 U.S. CONST. amend VII provides in relevant part: "In Suits at common law.., the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved ....
34 The seventh amendment has been held not to apply to suits against the sovereign because such suits
were not recognized at common law at the time the seventh amendment was enacted. See Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); McElrath v. United States,
102 U.S. 426 (1880); Mathes v. Commission of Internal Revenue, 576 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1978).
35 628 F.2d at 64. The plaintiff also argued that the Lorillard Court found the term "legal . . . relief"
significant for private ADEA actions. Even though Lorillard was a private action in which the seventh
amendment was applicable, Lorillard was decided upon statutory rather than seventh amendment grounds.
See Brief for Appellee at 12-13.
36 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 96-267, § 4(a), 92
Stat. 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1976)).
29 U.S.C. 5 626(c)(2) (Supp. 111978) provides in part: "In [a private ADEA action].., a person shall
be entitled.to a trial by jury of any issue of fact in any such action for recovery of amounts owing as a result
of a violation of this chapter regardless of whether equitable relief is sought by any party in such action."
37 628 F.2d at 64.
38 Id.
39 See note 6 supra.
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employees had been receiving under the Acts, it did not necessarily follow that
the same procedures were intended in federal actions as in private actions.
40
The dissent supported its distinction between protection and procedure on two
grounds. First, the dissent construed Congress' failure to mention the right to a
jury trial in the 1974 FLSA Amendments as indicating an intent to deny
federal employees any jury right.41 Second, the dissent observed that the 1974
amendments established a separate legislative scheme for federal employees
under the ADEA42 rather than amending the employee definition as was done
in the FLSA.43 The dissent argued that this divergence "indicates that Con-
gress contemplated different procedures for the two programs."
44
In the wake of Lorillard, Congress amended only private ADEA actions to
grant a jury right. The dissent considered Congress' failure to enact a parallel
amendment for federal ADEA actions45 to be a clear indication that Congress
intended to authorize the right to a jury trial only in private ADEA actions. 46
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority's reliance on what it termed
"dictum" in United States v. Pfitsch.47 The dissent contended that the exclusive
jurisdiction granted district courts in federal ADEA actions should not imply
the right to a jury trial, if based solely on the authority of Pfitsch.48
The Government's argument that there exists a sovereign immunity from
jury trials waivable only by an express provision granting a jury right49 may or
may not have been accepted by Judge Tamm.5 0 It does, however, state an ap-
parently new concept of sovereign immunity that is without support.
The Government's position was derived primarily from Galloway v. United
States ,5  a Supreme Court case confirming an implied jury right in an action
against the federal government under the War Risk Insurance Act. 52 The
Court in Galloway stated that because the seventh amendment was not ap-
plicable "of its own force" to the case, "whatever force-the Amendment has
. . . is derived because Congress, in the legislation cited, has made it ap-
40 628 F.2d at 67.
41 It should be noted, however, that if Congress intended a jury right before 1974, any silence on a jury
right in the 1974 FLSA Amendments could indicate the continuation of that jury right.
42 See note 76 infra.
43 See note 75 infra.
44 628 F.2d at 68 n.6.
45 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 626 (c) (1976) (explicit jury right) with 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1976 & Supp. II
1978) (no explicit jury right).
46 628 F.2d at 69.
47 256 U.S. 547 (1921). Pfitsch involved an action against the federal government under the Lever Act,
ch. 53, § 10, 40 Stat. 276 (1917), a wartime act allowing seizure of civilian supplies to aid the war effort. The
Court held that since the statute granted exclusive jurisdiction to district courts, an appeal would not be
taken by the Court directly but would go to the Court of Appeals. Thus, the appeal was dismissed for want
ofjurisdiction. The Court in dictum mentioned that exclusive jurisdiction in the district courts would "in-
cidentally" include the right to a jury trial. 256 U.S. at 552.
48 628 F.2d at 70. Judge Tamm emphasized that:
Pfitsch supplies the sole support for the assertions made in 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure: Civil § 2314, and 5 Moore's Federal Practice 38.31[2], that jurisdiction in
the United States District Court against the federal government carries with it the right to jury
trial.
Id. at 70 n.12.
49 See note 26 supra.
50 In seemingly contradictory fashion, Judge Tamm stated that a "fair implication" must be found,
628 F.2d at 66, but also referred to the "government's immunity from jury trial," 628 F.2d at 70. If the
Government's argument were to be followed, a sovereign immunity from jury trials would require an ex-
press waiver before any jury right could exist. See note 26 supra.
51 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
52 38 U.S.C. 9 784 (1976).
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plicable." 5 3 The Government argued that the Court by these statements made
it clear that an express legislative waiver of sovereign immunity is required to
create a jury right in an action against the United States.5 4
Although the Court in Galloway stated that Congress made the seventh
amendment applicable to suits against the government, it does not necessarily
follow that the Court was also describing whether Congress could apply the
seventh amendment expressly or impliedly. The Government assumed that
Congress had to grant expressly a jury right and cited Galloway as support. But
Galloway did not mention whether Congress must apply a seventh amendment
jury right expressly or impliedly. Instead, Galloway cited with approval Law v.
United States, 5 5 which held that plaintiffs in suits brought under the War Risk
Insurance Act have a right to a jury trial even though Congress did not explicit-
ly provide for jury trials under the Act.5 6 If there is, as the Government con-
tended in Nakshian, a "settled rule ... that Congress must unequivocally ex-
press a waiver of sovereign immunity in order to allow a right ofjury trial in an
action against the sovereign," 57 that rule is refuted rather than supported by
Galloway.
The traditional role of congressional waiver of sovereign immunity has
been to grant jurisdiction in suits brought against the federal government.
Thus, in United States v. King,5 the Supreme Court declared that "jurisdiction
to grant relief depends wholly upon the extent to which the United States has
waived its sovereign immunity to suit .... ,,59 Similarly, in United States v. Sher-
wood, 60 the Supreme Court held 6 that district courts lacked jurisdiction to hear
suits brought against the federal government under the Tucker Act of 1887.62
Concerning the limits marked by the government's waiver of sovereign im-
munity, however, the Court stated that "the terms of its consent to be sued in
any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." ' 63 The Court
warned that the issue ofjurisdictional waiver of sovereign immunity was not to
be confused with procedural issues. 64 Thus, a waiver of sovereign immunity
determines whether a certain action against the federal government can be
heard by a certain court; rules of procedure are a separate consideration.
The majority's rejection of the Government's position on sovereign im-
munity in Nakshian receives further support in a recent Ninth Circuit decision,
Franquez v. United States.65 The statute at issue in Franquez governed claims
against the United States respecting government-acquired land in Guam. 66
Although the statute was silent on the right to a jury trial, the district court
found that such a right existed. On appeal the Government argued (as in
53 319 U.S. at 388-89.
54 See Reply Brief for Appellant at 2.
55 266 U.S. 494 (1925).
56 See 319 U.S. at 389 n.18.
57 Reply Brief for Appellant at 4.
58 395 U.S. 1 (1969) (holding that the Court of Claims may not issue declaratory judgments).
59 Id. at 4.
60 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
61 Id. U.S. at 591.
62 Ch. 359, § 24(20), 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2401-02 (1976)).
63 Id. at 586 (emphasis added).
64 See id. at 591 ("the matter [of whether district courts could hear Tucker Act suits] is not one of pro-
cedure ofjurisdiction whose limits are marked by the Government's consent to be sued").
65 604 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979).
66 See Omnibus Territories Act of 1977, 48 U.S.C. § 1424(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
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Nakshian) that no jury right existed because the statute waiving sovereign im-
munity did not expressly authorize it.67 The Ninth Circuit cited Sherwood as
establishing that while "the terms of the sovereign's legislative consent to be
sued define the court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit," those terms do not
define the rules of procedure that the court must follow. 68 The Franquez court
concluded that the trial court had authority to grant a jury trial on the issue of
just compensation since it could be fairly implied from the statute that Con-
gress intended to authorize jury trials.
Franquez, King, Galloway, and Sherwood all stand for the proposition that a
right to a jury trial may be implied when Congress waives its sovereign im-
munity from unconsented suits, since express authorization is-required only for
jurisdiction to entertain the suit. No case requires specific authorization for the
particular judicial procedures to be used after jurisdiction has been granted.
The Government's position that there exists a "traditional sovereign immunity
against jury trials" is therefore without support and misconstrues the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
Unfortunately the specific congressional intent underlying the ADEA is
less clear. First, the ADEA was enacted in 1967 for the express purposes of pro-
moting older persons' employment based on their ability, and of prohibiting all
arbitrary age discrimination in employment. 69 Congress thus appears to have
had as its specific goal the eradication of age discrimination in all employment,
without regard to whether the employer and employee were in the public or
private sector. 70 Second, although the original ADEA did not include federal
employers within its scope, 71 this exclusion was later characterized as inadver-
tent. 72 When the ADEA was amended in 1974 to include federal employees,
the House Report described the amendment as a "logical extension of the
Committee [on Education and Labor's] decision to extend FLSA coverage to
Federal, State and local government employees." 73 Finally, Congress' use of
the same language in both the federal and private enforcement sections seems
to reveal an intent that both sections be apllied in the same manner. Thus, a
cogent argument may be made that the 1974 FLSA Amendments furthered the
congressional purpose of offering an ADEA iemedy to all employees,
regardless of their private or public status.
A persuasive argument of the plaintiff, set forth in the Nakshian majority's
opinion, concerned the link between the ADEA and the FLSA. Neither Act ap-
plied to actions against the federal government until 1974, 74 when Congress
67 604 F.2d at 1243 n.13.
68 Id. at 1243. The Franquez court stated: "[w]e disagree with the government's reading of Sherwood
and find no support for the conclusion that specific terms must define the court's procedure." Id. at 1243
n.13.
69 See 29 U.S.C. 5 621(b).
70 See id. at 5 621. The congressional statement of findings and purpose does not distinguish between
private and government employers. Congress may well have been concerned with age discrimination in
general in drafting the ADEA.
71 See ADEA, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 5 11, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 5 630(b) (1976)).
72 See note 74 infra.
73 H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws
2811, 2849.
74 See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 (1974 FLSA Amendments), Pub. L. No. 93-259, S
6(a) (1), (6), 88 Stat. 55 (1974) (amending 29 U.S.C. 5 203 (1970)); id., 5 28(b) (2) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 5
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amended the FLSA definition of employer to include all units of government 75
and added to the ADEA a section authorizing actions against the federal
government. 76 The plaintiff argued that because Congress did not alter FLSA
procedures in amending the FLSA employer definition, it intended the same
procedures to apply to both federal and private FLSA actions. 7 7 The plaintiff
noted that the ADEA provided for enforcement according to the "powers,
remedies, and procedures" of the FLSA, 78 under which a right to a jury trial
clearly exists in suits against private employers. 79 The congressional intent to
authorize a jury right in federal FLSA actions, therefore, applied equally to
federal ADEA actions.80 The plaintiff's argument found further support in
Congress' terming the ADEA amendment a "logical extension of the ... deci-
sion to extend FLSA coverage to Federal . . . employees.""'
The ADEA was further amended in 1978, in the wake of the Lorillard deci-
sion, to provide expressly for the right to ajury trial in private ADEA actions. 82
As the Nakshian dissent observed, no parallel amendment of section 633a was
offered.8 3 However, the remarks of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the amend-
ment's floor sponsor, illustrate the "general" nature of the amendment.84
Senator Kennedy deemed it "wise to insure that particular protection [ex-
tends] to those who are subject to age discrimination.''8 Nowhere in the
amendment itself nor in Senator Kennedy's remarks is any distinction made
between types of employers.8 6
Nevertheless, since there was no parallel amendment to section 633a, the
633a (1976)). Committee reports on the 1974 FLSA Amendments illustrate that the omission of federal
employees from original ADEA coverage was inadvertent:
The Committee recognizes that the omission . . . did not represent a conscious decision by the
Congress to limit the ADEA to employment in the private sector. It reflects the fact, that in 1967,
when ADEA was enacted, most government employees were outside the scope of the FLSA ....
S. REP. No. 690, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1974).
75 See note 74 supra, S 6(a) (1), (6) (amending 29 U.S.C. 5 203 (1970)).
76 Id., § 28(b) (2) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1976)). It is not clear why Congress added a new sec-
tion to the ADEA rather than amending the employer definition, found at 29 U.S.C. § 630 (b) (1976). In
1972, Senator Lloyd Bentsen introduced a bill to amend the ADEA definition of employer to include all
governmental units, but the bill was not acted upon. See S. 3318, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONo. REc. 7745
(1972). Later that term, however, Senator Bentsen introduced an amendment to include in the proposed
FLSA Amendments of 1972 a new ADEA section extending coverage to employees of all governmental
units. See S. 1861, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 23952 (1972). That version of the FLSA Amend-
ments finally passed the Congress and was signed by the President in 1974. See 1974 FLSA Amendments,
Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974). Why Senator Bentsen changed the form of his amendment is
unknown and cannot be deduced from the legislative history of the FLSA Amendments.
77 628 F.2d at 61.
78 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
79 The FLSA jury right extends to actions for back pay, which are "analogous to actions at law." Wirtz
v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1965). See also Lewis v. Times Publishing Co., 185 F.2d 457 (5th Cir.
1950); Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under the Age Discrimination in Employment and Fair Labor Standards Acts, 44
U. Cm. L. REV. 365 (1977); Note, Fair Labor Standards Act and Trial by Juy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 514 (1965).
In Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-83 (1978), the Supreme Court stated that Congress had reason
to know the interpretation given to a statute when incorporating it into another, and such an interpretation
would apply as well to the later statute.
80 One court has implied that federal employees in an FLSA action have the right to a jury trial. See
Carter v. Marshall, 26 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 610 (D.D.C. 1978).
81 See note 73 supra.
82 See note 36 supra.
83 628 F.2d at 68.
84 See 123 CONo. REC. S17,296 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
85 Id. at S17,297.
86 Senator Kennedy emphasized: "It does seem to me that when a particular plaintiff in an age
discrimination case feels aggrieved, if he desires to be able to utilize the procedures which are in the FLSA,
which do provide for a jury trial, that it would be important not to deny him that opportunity." Id.
312 [December 19801
dissent insisted that Congress must have intended to authorize jury trials only
for private ADEA actions under section 626.87 The majority countered by
describing the 1978 amendment as a congressional attempt to "reiterat[e] its
belief in the appropriateness ofjury trials in ADEA actions and ... confirm the
right whenever doubt appeared .... ,,81 Indeed, Senator Kennedy referred to
his amendment as an attempt to "clarify" 89 a situation that was the subject of
conflict in the courts of appeals. 90 Furthermore, since the amendment was of-
fered before Lorillard was decided, the amendment was not merely a codifica-
tion. of Lorillard. 91
The stated purpose of the 1978 ADEA Amendments was "to provide for
jury trials in actions brought under the ADEA of 1967."92 The absence of a
private-federal distinction in the amendment is understandable, since at the
time the amendment was enacted the right to ajury trial in a federal ADEA ac-
tion had not yet been litigated. 93 That circumstance adds to the reasonableness
of the Nakshidn majority's conclusion that Congress acted only to correct errors
in the existing ADEA framework. Nevertheless, if Congress had actually
meant to protect all potential plaintiffs, it would have taken little extra effort to
amend section 633a as well as section 626. Congress' failure to expend that ef-
fort indicates that it did not foresee litigation in the federal sector and over-
looked the issue. Thus, the 1978 ADEA Amendments present weak support at
best for both the majority and dissenting opinions.
United States v. Pfitsch94 provides equally weak support for either opinion.
The dissent in Nakshian correctly pointed out that Pfitsch's references to a jury
right arising from exclusive district court jurisdiction were dicta. 95 Reliance on
Pfitsch is yet another example of the need for courts to resort to weak indicia of
legislative intent. 96 The majority and dissenting opinions both rely on uncer-
tain indicia as to what Congress may have been thinking when it dealt with the
ADEA. A more logical and honest approach is to assume that Congress
thought nothing about jury trials in the federal sector, and thus left no indica-
tions as to whether it intended to grant a jury right.
Due to the silence of Congress, courts addressing federal employees' right
to ajury trial under the ADEA have been forced to resort to their own opinions
as to what Congress would have intended had it dealt with the issue. In such a
87 628 F.2d at 69 ("the failure to adopt a parallel amendment indicates that Congress did not extend its
waiver of sovereign immunity to permit jury trials for federal employees"). One lower federal court has
found the Nakshian dissent's argument persuasive. See Edmondson v. Simon, No. 76-4591 (N.D. Ill., Aug.
26, 1980).
88 628 F.2d at 65.
89 123 CoNG. REc. at S17,296 ("this particular amendment is to clarify section [626(c)] of the ADEA,
which applies to lawsuits brought by aggrieved individuals on their own behalf"). Note Sen. Kennedy's use
of the word "individuals" rather than "private employees."
90 See note 2 supra.
91 Sen. Kennedy presented the clarifying amendment to the Senate floor on October 19, 1977. Lorillard
was decided by the Supreme Court on February 22, 1978.
92 123 CONG. REc. at S17,296.
93 See 628 F.2d at 65.
94 256 U.S. 547 (1921).
95 See note 47 supra. The fact that noted authorities have argued the same principle in reliance on Pfitsch,
however, indicates that the principle is somewhat settled despite the absence of strong case support. See note
28 supra. But see note 48 supra.
96 See generally Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: A Peek into the Mind and Will of a Legislature, 50 IND. L.J.
206 (1975) (the most common approach to statutory interpretation is to fall back on extrinsic sources which
vary in reliability and accessibility, in an effort to grasp a fictitious subjective intent).
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divining process, a court's interpretation of a fictitious congressional intent97
will ultimately be controlled by the court's own policy judgments. 98 The
Nakshian majority concluded its discussion of congressional intent with Con-
gressman Claude Pepper's remark that federal policy favors granting federal
employees a jury right when they bring suit under the ADEA. 99 The dissent
ended on a policy note as well, arguing that jury trials are a "favor [that] does
not extend to suits against the Government" 100 and that the courts should not
grant jury trials in federal ADEA actions where Congress has foregone an op-
portunity to so provide. 10 1
The majority and dissenting opinions in Nakshian are both reasonable
opinions revealing judicial "legislating" made necessary by congressional
silence. It is unfortunate that the silence occurred in the area of the right to a
jury trial, an area which has often evoked strong reactions from segments of the
judicial system. 10 2 Knowing that the ADEA had caused jury issue problems
prior to Lorillard and that such problems could arise in the federal sector, Con-
gress should have amended section 633a as well as section 626. By not amend-
ing section 633a, and by not explicitly stating that a jury right exists in all
ADEA actions, Congress invited the judiciary to legislate the issue for itself. 103
Congress should act soon to codify its policy before the Supreme Court is again
forced to search for congressional intent regarding jury trials under the ADEA.
Ralph E. Dejong
Labor Law-HOsPITAL HOUSE STAFF-NLRB DID NOT EXCEED ITS
STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN HOLDING THAT HOUSE STAFF ARE NOT EMPLOYEES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE NLRA-Physicians National House StaffAssociation
v. Fanning,-F.2d-(D.C. Cir. 1980)*
Prior to 1974, the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)' exempted from
its coverage private non-profit hospitals. The 1974 Health Care Amendments
(the Amendments) brought such hospitals within the purview of the Act for the
97 See Lehman, How to Interpret a Difficult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 489, 500 ("the intent of the
legislature is a phantom because the will of the legislature is a metaphor"); Dickerson, supra note 96; Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930).
98 See Lehman, supra note 97. Prof. Lehman points out the distinction between the positivist (one who
looks to the act of the legislature as law) and the realist (the law is what a judge says it is). While courts
engaging in statutory interpretation attempt to be positivists examining what the legislature did or intended
to do, they in fact are realists swayed by their own notions of what the law ought to be.
99 628 F.2d at 65, quoting 125 CONG. REC. E 4258 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979) (remarks of Cong. Pepper).
Cong. Pepper emphasized his policy position as follows:
Those who participated in the House and Senate debates would be surprised to learn that
legislative efforts to confirm the right to ajury trial have been construed as a denial of that right.
It would be indefensible to deny Federal employees the right to a jury trial. Under any legislative
enactment in the field ofcivil rights, the Federal Government should be the leader not a grudging
participant.
Id.
100 628 F.2d at 70.
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 551 (1970) (Stewart,J., dissenting) ("the Court's decision
today can perhaps be explained as a reflection of an articulated but apparently overpowering bias in favor of
jury trials in civil actions").
103 Cf Nakshian with Edmondson v. Simon, No. 76-4591 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 26, 1980) and Huber v. Mar-
shall, No. 78-1104 (D.D.C., Feb. 22, 1979).
No 78-1209 (D.C. Cir. July 11, 1980).
1 29 U.S.C. §5 151-69 (1976).
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first time.2 Immediately thereafter a strong movement to organize health care
employees began.3 Included in this movement were private hospital house
staffs, which consist of interns, residents, and clinical fellows. 4 At several
hospitals the house staffs formed associations for the purpose of bargaining col-
lectively, pursuant to section 9(c) of the Act. 5 Accordingly, these associations
petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) to order the holding
of elections to certify them as the lawful bargaining agents of the hospital's
house staff.6 These petitions provided the factual basis upon which Physicians
National House Staff Association v. Fanning7 arose.
Petitions by house staff associations were sent to the regional offices of the
Board in 1974 and 1975,8 and hearings were then held on the house staff peti-
tions. 9 The Board found the petitions of house staff to be important, and
selected a representative case for oral argument. That case, Cedars-Sinai Medical
Center, t0 involved the petition of the Cedars-Sinai Housestaff Association. Oral
argument was heard by the Board on September 8, 1975. The Board dismissed
the petition, holding the petitioner was not a labor organization." More
specifically, the Board ruled house staff were not within the definition of
employees provided in section 2(3)12 of the Act. Instead, the Board determined
house staff were more properly characterized as "primarily students. ' 1 3
2 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) (defines employer); 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (defines employee); 29
U.S.C. § 152(14) (1976) (defines health care institution).
3 See Speech by Stephen P. Pepe at National Institute on Hospitals and Health Care Facilities (April
28-29, 1977), reprinted in LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALS AND THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
7-8 (A. Knapp ed. 1977) [hereinafter referred to as Speech by Pepe]. The effective date of the Amendments
was August 25, 1974, Brief for Appellant at 4, Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Fanning, No. 78-1209
(D.C. Cir. July 11, 1980), and on Monday, August 26, 1974, the regional offices of the Board were inun-
dated with health care petitions. Speech by Pepe at 8.
4 Id. at 8 n.27: "An intern is a medical school graduate who is serving a one-year internship to qualify
for the examination to practice medicine. A resident is a physician who has completed his internship and
serves a period of 1-5 years for more advanced training. A clinical fellow is a physician who has completed
his internship and residency and is engaged in further study and training to become certified in a subspecial-
ty. These individuals are collectively referred to as 'house staff.' " See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223
N.L.R.B. 251, 255-57 (1976) (Fanning, dissenting); H.R. REP. No. 504, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1979).
5 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976). See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. at 251; Speech by Pepe,
supra note 3, at 7-9.
6 Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Fanning, No. 78-1209, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. July 11, 1980).
See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. at 251; Speech by Pepe, supra note 3, at 7-9.
7 No. 78-1209 (D.C. Cir. July 11, 1980).
8 Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Fanning, No. 78-1209 (D.C. Cir.
July 11, 1980).
9 See Speech by Pepe, supra note 3, at 8.
10 223 N.L.R.B. at 251.
11 Id. The decision was vigorously criticized by a number of commentators. See Note, Student- Workers or
Working Students? A Fatal Question for Collective Bargaining of Hospital House Staff, 38 U. PsT. L. REv. 762
(1977); Speech by Joel A. D'Alba at National Institute on Hospitals and Health Care Facilities (April 28-29,
1977), reprinted in LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALS AND THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 19-23
(A. Knapp ed. 1977) [hereinafter referred to as Speech by D'Alba]; Speech by Murray A. Gordon at Na-
tional Institute on Hospitals and Health Care Facilities (April 28-29, 1977), reprinted in LABOR RELATIONS
LAW PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALS AND THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 94-98 (A. Knapp ed. 1977); Speech by
Representative Frank Thompson, Jr. at National Institute on Hospitals and Health Care Facilities (April
28-29, 1977), reprinted in LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALS AND THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
141-142 (A. Knapp ed. 1977). Cf Speech by G. Roger King at National Institute on Hospitals and Health
Care Facilities (April 28-29, 1977), reprinted in LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALS AND THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 173-174 (A. Knapp ed. 1977); Speech by Peter D. Walther at National Institute on
Hospitals and Health Care Facilities (April 28-29, 1977), reprinted in LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN
HOSPITALS AND THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 66-68 (A. Knapp ed. 1977).
12 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
13 223 N.L.R.B. at 251.
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Subsequent decisions by the Board have followed this ruling, 14 and these Board
decisions have been held to preempt state labor relations boards from asserting
jurisdiction over house staff.15 As a result, house staff are unable to collectively
bargain under federal or state law.1 6
Physicians National House Staff Association,1 7 the house staff associations
of three private non-profit hospitals,1 8 and a union of house staff personnel1 9
(hereinafter referred to as the house staff associations) then filed suit in Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia. 20 They petitioned the district court
to vacate the dismissal of their representation petitions by the Board, to declare
that house staff were employees within the meaning of the Act and to order the
Board to assume jurisdiction of their certification petitions. 2' The district court
decided it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, finding that the absence of
a "clear statutory mandate" 22 precluded judicial review. 23
This decision was appealed to a three judge panel24 of the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia. In a two to one decision, handed down on
April 2, 1979, the panel reversed and remanded the district court decision.2 5
On June 5, 1979, the court of appeals granted the petition for a rehearing
en banc. 26 The en banc court of appeals vacated the panel's decision, and af-
firmed the ruling of the district court by a five to four decision.2 7
Judicial review of Board decisions concerning certification proceedings is
allowed in limited circumstances.2 8 Section 9(d) 29 of the Act provides for
judicial review of certification proceedings only in connection with judicial
review of unfair labor practice (ULP) orders of the Board 30 under section
10(f).3 There were no ULP orders issued by the Board in Fanning.
The house staff associations argued that the district court nonetheless had
14 St. Christopher's Hosp. for Children, 223 N.L.R.B. 166 (1976); St. Clare's Hosp. and Health
Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1976); University of Chicago Hosps. and Clinics, 223 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1976);
Buffalo Gen. Hosp., 224 N.L.R.B., 76 (1976); Kansas City Gen. Hosp., 225 N.L.R.B. 108 (1976); Wayne
State Univ., 226 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1976).
15 NLRB v. Committee of Interns & Residents, 566 F.2d 810 (2d. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904
(1978).
16 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 3-4 n.2 (majority), 25 n.62 (dissent).
17 About 40,000 of the nation's 60,000 interns and residents belonged to the Physicians National House
Staff Association in 1976. No. 78-1209, slip op. at I n.l (dissent).
18 The three were Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (Los Angeles), St. Christopher's Hospital
(Philadelphia), and the University of Chicago Hospitals.
19 The union was the Committee of Interns and Residents located in New York City.
20 Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Murphy, 443 F. Supp. 806 (D. D.C. 1978).
21 Id. at 808.
22 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 19 (dissent).
23 443 F. Supp. at 810, 811. See text accompanying notes 34-39 infra.
24 The panel consisted of ChiefJudge Wright, Circuit Judge Robb, and District Judge Richey, sitting
by designation persuant to 28 U.S.C. 292(a) (1976).
25 Physicians Nat'l House StaffAss'n v. Murphy, No. 78-1209, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. April 2, 1979).
26 Supplemental Brief for Appellants at iii, Physicians Nat'l House StaffAss'n v. Fanning, No. 78-1209
(D.C. Cir. July 11, 1980).
27 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 4.
28 See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 476-79 (1964); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184,
187 (1958); A.F.L. v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409-12 (1940); Comment,Judicial Review of Preliminary Orders of
National Labor Administrative Agencies After Leedom v. Kyne, 8 BUFFALO L. REv. 372, 376-77 (1959) [hereinafter
referred to as Comment, Judicial Review]; Comment, Labor Law-Collective Bargaining-Jurisdiction of District
Court to Vacate An Unlawful Order of the NLRB, 57 MICH. L. REv. 910, 911 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as
Comment, Labor Law].
29 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1976).
30 See note 28 supra.
31 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1976).
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jurisdiction, 32 based on the exception of Leedom v. Kyne.33 In that 1958 decision,
the United States Supreme Court held that a district court has jurisdiction to
invalidate non-ULP orders of the Board "made in excess of the Board's
delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act."134 The
Supreme Court made it clear this was not a review of the Board's decision, at
least not in the sense review was used in the Act. Instead, it involved nullifying
a Board order made in excess of the Board's statutory authority. 35
In Kyne, a group of 233 professional employees and 9 nonprofessional
employees had been certified as a bargaining unit by the Board. Kyne was the
president of the local Westinghouse Engineers Association, Engineers and
Scientists of America, organized to collectively bargain for non-supervisory
professional employees, at the Westinghouse plant in Cheektowaga, New
York. Kyne brought suit to invalidate the Board certification action, based on
the deprivation of the professional employees' right to vote for the inclusion of
the nonprofessional employees in the bargaining unit pursuant to section
9(b)(1) of the Act.36 The Supreme Court found section 9(b)(1) to be "clear and
mandatory" 37 and determined that in such extraordinary circumstances the
district court had jurisdiction to "strike down an order of the Board.' '38
The en bane majority in Fanning did not find a clear statutory mandate in
the Act's wording or its legislative history that house staff were employees
under the Act. 39 As a result, the en bane majority held the Board's decision is
unreviewable by a district court, 40 supporting the district court's decision that
it lacked jurisdiction. 41 The en bane majority's decision is directly contrary to
the three judge panel's conclusion that the "congressional instructions" were
clear and mandatory that house staff were employees under the Act.4 2
The en bane majority first dealt with the argument of the house staff
associations that the clear statutory mandate that house staff were employees
was found in section 2(3) of the Act, which defines "employees." 43 The en banc
majority pointed out that the question of who was an employee under section
32 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 2 (dissent).
33 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
34 Id. at 188. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 346-48 (1965) (discussion of
district court jurisdiction under Kyne and the presumption of judicial review).
35 358 U.S. at 188. It has been contended this method of determining jurisdiction is the equivalent of
putting the cart before the horse, in that a court must examine the case on its merits to determine if it has
jurisdiction. Comment, Judicial Review, supra note 28, at 383 n.74. See Physicians Nat'l House Staff Assn, No.
78-1209, slip op. at 8 n.21 (dissent).
36 358 U.S. at 185-89. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1976).
37 358 U.S. at 188. Based on the legislative history, the Board had interpreted section 9(b)(1) to allow
the Board to skip the vote where the professional employees had a large majority. See, e.g., Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 591, 595 n.11 (1948); Continental Motors Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 345, 347-48
(1948). The applicable legislative history is contained in S. REP. No. 105, 80TH CONO., 1sT SFss. 11 (1947);
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1947). See Comment,'Judical Review, supra note 28, at 388
n.93; Comment, EquitableJurisdiction to Review N.L.R.B. Certification Orders, 11 STAN. L. REv. 760, 762 n.12,
768 n.37 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as Comment, Equitable Jurisdiction].
38 358 U.S. at 158. The jurisdictional grant is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976). The 1978 amendment
did not affect this jurisdictional grant. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (1978).
39 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 8-15.
40 Id. at 15.
41 443 F. Supp. at 811.
42 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 24 (panel decision).
43 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 8. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
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2(3) was a factual determination left to the Board's discretion. 44 Here, the
Board decided that house staff were not employees.4 5
The house staff associations then argued that the Board's finding that
house staff possessed "employee characteristics ' 46 required the Board to
classify house staff as employees. The en banc majority disagreed, 47 citing
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Corp.48 Bell Aerospace involved a Board determination
that managerial employees were not excluded under the Act. The employer
refused to bargain and a ULP order was issued by the Board. 49 The case even-
tually went before the Supreme Court, which held that, although not specifical-
ly excluded from section 2(3), managerial employees were not covered by the
Act.50 The en banc majority interpreted Bell Aerospace to mean "persons who are
literally 'employees' may be excluded from coverage under the act" for policy
reasons.5 " The en banc majority concluded house staff could be excluded,
therefore, even though they possessed employee characteristics.
The en banc majority also rejected the argument that specific statutory
authority for classifying house staff as employees was found in the definition of
"professional employee" under section 2(12) of the Act.5 2 Section 2(12) was in-
terpreted by the en banc majority as classifying only those people already found
to be employees. 53 They concluded the section was inapplicable, therefore,
since house staff could not be professional employees until they had first been
found to be employees.5 4
The house staff associations also argued that the legislative history of the
Amendments provided a clear statutory mandate that house staff be classified
as employees. The en banc majority concluded no congressional directive ex-
isted that required house staff to be classified as employees.55 The en banc ma-
jority ascertained from an examination of the reports of the congressional com-
mittees that the committees expected the Board to follow its normal procedures
in determining whether employees were supervisors. As a result, it was
reasonable to conclude that the committees expected the Board to follow its
normal procedures in determining whether people were employees.5 6
44 No. 78-1209 at 8. See, e.g., Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 304 n.14 (1977);
NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1947); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S.
111, 130-31 (1944).
45 223 N.L.R.B. at 251.
46 Id.
47 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 9.
48 416 U.S. 267 (1974). For a critique of the use of BellAerospace by the majority, see the text accompa-
nying notes 112-23 infra. The majority also cited Allied Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157, 168 (1971) for support. For a good discussion of Allied see Physicians Nat'l House StaffAss'n, No.
78-1209, slip op. at 20-21 n.55 (dissent).
49 416 U.S. at 270-72.
50 Id. at 275.
51 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 9-10.
52 Id. 29 U.S.C. 5 152(12) (1976):
(12) The term "professional employee" means-
(a) any employee engaged in work... (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of
science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruc-
tion and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital . . .; or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual instruction and
study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related work under the
supervision of a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
53 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 10. Cf Polner, Representation Rights of Professional and Technical Employees, 10
LAB. L. J. 405, 407 (1959) (passed to provide a specific definition of the modern professional employee).
54 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 10.
55 Id. at 10-13.
56 Id. at 11. The majority relied on H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d CONe., 2d SFSs. 7 (1974) AND S. REP.
No. 766, 93d CONG., 2d SEss. 6 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3951.
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The en banc majority admitted that the committees' discussion of the
supervisor issue, 57 and the remarks made on the floor by Senator Cranston, 58 a
floor manager of the Amendments, and Senator Dominick, 59 an opponent of
the Amendments, indicated a belief on the part of Congress that the Board
would find house staff were employees under the Act.60 The en banc majority
nonetheless decided that was insufficient to invoke jurisdiction under the Kyne
exception. 6 1 The en banc majority implied the legislative history would have had
to have contained a specific statement declaring house staff to be employees,
before they would have upheld district court jurisdiction based on the Kyne ex-
ception. 62
To further support this conclusion, the en banc majority looked to House
Bill 2222,63 which was introduced in 1979 and provided for an amendment of
the Act to include house staff.64 The recent failure of the bill in the House of
Representatives 65 was interpreted by the en banc majority as indicative of the
congressional intent that the Board retain discretion to decide whether house
staff were employees under the Act. 66
Finally, the en banc majority addressed the house staff associations'
equitable plea that without a finding of jurisdiction the house staff decisions
would never be subject to judicial review. The en banc majority dismissed this
argument, finding that Congress clearly intended to deny judicial review in an
attempt to expedite the collective bargaining process. 67
Judge Wright led a strong dissent that concluded the district court had
jurisdiction based on the Kyne exception. 68 The dissenting judges' conclusion
was based on an analysis of four factors they felt were relevant in a Kyne excep-
tion analysis. The four factors were: (1) Whether a question of statutory inter-
57 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 11 n. 6. The explicit reference in both reports (see note 56) to "health care
professionals such as registered nurses, interns, residents, fellows and salaried physicians," prompted this
concession by the majority.
58• No. 78-1209, slip op. at 12. 120 CoNG. REC. 12937 (1974).
59 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 12. 120 CONG. REC. 12971, 22580 (1974).
60 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 11-12. For a good discussion of the weight to be given statements by op-
ponents and managers of a bill, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 164-65 (1968) (Black, J., concur-
ring).
61 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 11-12.
62 Id. at 11-12 (majority), 18-19 (dissent).
63 H.R. 2222, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
64 Id. See H.R. REP. No. 504, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-9 (majority views), 10-19 (minority and in-
dividual views) (1979), reprinted in 125 CONG. REc. H11295-11304 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1979). H.R. 15842
and H.R. 2222, introduced in the 94th and 95th Congress' respectively, were similar to H.R. 2222 (1979).
Neither was brought to a vote.
65 The bill was defeated on November 28, 1979 (227 against, 167 for). 125 CONG. REC. HI 1304 (daily
ed. Nov. 28, 1979).
66 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 12-13.
67 Id. at 13-14. H.R. REp. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947) contained a provision which would
have allowed immediate judicial review of Boaid certification decisions. This provision was eliminated in
conference. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-57 (1947), reprinted in [1947] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. Naws 1163. Senator Taft in explanation said: "In receding on their insistence on this portion, the
House yielded to the view of the Senate conferees that such provision would permit dilatory tactics in
representation proceedings." 93 CONG. REG. 6444 (1947). See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. at
476-79; Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. at 197 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Public Resolution 44, 48 Stat.
1183 (1934), which allowed judicial review of certification proceedings. The following year it was replaced,
because of its use as a stalling device. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 455 (1935)(judicial review of ULP
orders only); S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 14 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6, 23 (1935); H.R. RaP. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 20-21 (1935); Comment, Judicial Review,
supra note 28, at 377; Comment, Labor Law-National Labor Relations Board-Judicial Review of Representation
Proceedings,50 IowA L. REv. 931, 933-34 (1965). See also Comment, Labor Law, supra note 28, at 911.
68 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 2, 30 (dissent).
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pretation or a question of fact was involved; (2) "whether the statutory provi-
sion [was] 'clear and mandatory' in creating rights for those subject to the
[Act]"; (3) whether any "realistic hope" of judicial review, in conjunction
with a ULP order, existed for the party challenging the Board action; and
(4) whether the purpose of the Act would be thwarted if jurisdiction were
granted in this case. 69
Addressing the first factor, whether a question of statutory interpretation
or a question of fact was involved, Judge Wright concluded the question was a
statutory one. 70 Noting the wide sweep of section 2(3)71 of the Act and the
absence of house staff among its exclusions, he pointed out how the section was
held to have a broad application. 72
Judge Wright next dealt with the majority's conclusion that the section
2(12) definition of professional employee only applied to persons classified as
employees.7 3 He conceded the classification applied only after a person had
been determined to be an employee under section 2(3) of the Act, but explained
that section 2(12) mirrored the congressional intent as to who falls within the
employee definition. 74 This observation was reinforced by the statement in the
House Conference Report on Section 2(12) at the time of its enactment: "This
definition in general covers such persons as legal, engineering, scientific and
medical personnel together with their junior professional assistants. "75
Examining the legislative history of the Amendments, Judge Wright con-
cluded Congress intended house staffs to be covered by the Act. 76 He cited in
support of his conclusion statements in the hearings held by the Subcommittee
on Labor, 77 the House and Senate reports, 78 and the statements made on the
floor by the co-manager 79 and by the leading opponent of the Amendments.
8 0
69 Id. at 8 (dissent).
70 Id. at 15 (dissent).
71 29 U.S.C. 5 152(3) (1976).
72 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 10 (dissent). NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. at 129 (ap-
plicability to be determined broadly).
73 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976).
74 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 11 (dissent). See also BellAerospace, 416 U.S. at 297-98 (White, J. dissenting);
Polner, supra note 53, at 407.
75 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 11-12 (dissent). H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1947),
reprinted in [1947] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1141. NLRB Chairman Fanning, in Cedars-Sinai, see text
accompanying notes 11-13 supra, in his dissent stated: "[T]he definition fits, precisely, housestaff officers."
223 N.L.R.B. at 258 (Fanning, dissent).
76 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 12-15 (dissent). Based on the Amendment's legislative history, the Second
Circuit concluded Congress "considered housestaffs within the scope of the Health Care Amendments."
566 F.2d at 815.
77 Coverage of Nonprofit Hospitals Under the National Labor Relations Act, 1973: Hearing Before the Sub-comm. on
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 291-423 (August 1, 1973).
Spokesmen for house staff associations urged the committee to include a provision in the Amendments
specifically stating house staff were not "supervisory employees." Id. at 292-345, 354. Reference was also
made in these hearings to states where house staff had been bargaining collectively and the success they had
in those states in regard to patient care. Id.
78 H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974) and S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1974). It is important to note Judge Wright interpreted these reports to contain an underlying assumption
that house staff were employees. The majority read them as saying if the procedure was going to remain the
same for determining if a person was a supervisory employee, then it was going to remain the same for
determining if a person was an employee. No. 78-1209, slip op. at 11 (majority), 13 (dissent).
79 See note 58 supra. The co-manager of the Amendments was Senator Cranston. Judge Wright felt
house staff would not have been cited by Cranston had Cranston not thought house staff were covered by the
legislation. No. 78-1209, slip op. at 14 (dissent).
80 See note 59 supra. The leading opponent of the Amendments was Senator Dominick. Judge Wright
emphasized Dominick's continued reference to house staff as employees under the Act. No. 78-1209, slip
op. at 14 (dissent).
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The second factor Judge Wright dealt with was whether the statutory pro-
vision was clear and mandatory in creating rights for those subject to the Act.
He concluded there was a clear statutory mandate that house staff were
employees under the Act. Judge Wright based this conclusion primarily on his
examination of the Act and its legislative history, made simultaneously with his
inquiry into whether a statutory or factual issue was involved. He did not
believe the Act or the legislative history had to contain a specific statement that
house staff were employees. From the Act and the legislative history combined,
Judge Wright found the requisite clear statutory mandate. 81
In further support of this conclusion, Judge Wright advanced the argu-
ment that in Congress' consideration of the Amendments they had obviously
assumed house staff were employees.8 2 Recognition of house staff as employees
under state labor law8 3 and the absence of any controversy over the issue dur-
ing the congressional hearings were emphasized as the basis for the congres-
sional assumption. 4
In his discussion of whether there was a clear statutory mandate, Judge
Wright expressed dissatisfaction with the majority's view. He questioned85 the
majority's interpretation of Bell Aerospace that "for policy reasons persons who
are literally 'employees' may nonetheless be excluded from coverage under the
[A]ct."18 6 Judge Wright interpreted that case to mean managerial employees
were excluded from coverage under the Act, because that was the congressional
intent.87 Judge Wright also relied on BellAerospace as support for his stance that
a specific congressional directive to the Board to find house staff to be
employees was not necessary. He pointed out how his examination of the
legislative history paralleled that of the Supreme Court. He also showed how
the Supreme Court found Congress meant to exclude managerial employees,
even absent specific language in the Act and its legislative history to that
effect. 88
Judge Wright rebutted the en banc majority argument that the recent
failure of HR 2222,89 which provided for an amendment of the Act to include
house staff, was strong and relevant evidence of congressional intent that house
staff should not be covered under the Act. According to Judge Wright, the rele-
vant congressional intent is that of the Congress which enacted the legislation
being examined. 90 Judge Wright concluded that the inaction of one house of
Congress was not indicative of an earlier congressional intent. 9'
81 No. 78-1209, slip. op. at 15-16, 18-19 (dissent).
82 Id. at 23-24 (dissent).
83 See Regents v. Michigan Employment Relations Comm'n, 389 Mich. 96, 204 N.W.2d 218 (1973);
Brooklyn Eye & Ear Hosp., 64 LRRM 1344 (New York 1966); H.R. REP. No. 504, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1979); Coverage of Nonprofit Hospitals Under the National Labor Relations Act, 1973:, supra note 77, at 292-96,
354. See H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 15 (1974) (Minnesota experience).
84 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 23-24 (dissent).
85 Id. at 20 (dissent).
86 Id. at 9-10.
87 Id. at 19-20 (dissent). After an examination of the legislative history, the Supreme Court in Bell
Aerospace stated: "We think the inference is plain that 'managerial employees' were paramount among this
impliedly excluded group." 416 U.S. at 282-84.
88 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 19-20 (dissent). See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 283-84.
89 See notes 63-66 supra and accompanying text.
90 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 21-23. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 n.7
(1977); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 310-12 (1960); Fogarty v. United States, 340 U.S. 8, 13-14
(1950); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 281-82 (1947).
91 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 22 (dissent).
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The third factor considered in the dissent was whether any realistic hope
of judicial review, in conjunction with a ULP order, was present for the party
challenging the Board action. The en banc majority admitted house staff had no
other recourse to judicial review. 92 Judge Wright emphasized this lack of
judicial review, noting that the only other means available to attain judicial
review could very possibly subject house staff to a law suit. 93 Because of the
finality of the Board ruling, Judge Wright decided the refusal to certify should
have been deemed a final order subject to judicial review. 94 Judge Wright
focused on the conclusion of the Court in Kyne, that the employees had "no
other means within their control" 95 to protect their rights. 96 Judge Wright
combined this with his interpretation of Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 97 that the
availability of judicial review was an important consideration in a Kyne excep-
tion analysis, 98 to justify his conclusion.99
The fourth and final factorJudge Wright considered was whether the pur-
pose of the Act would be thwarted if jurisdiction was granted in Fanning. Judge
Wright found the Act was designed to eliminate recognition strikes and lead to
collective bargaining; he reasoned certification of the house staff associations
would accomplish, not thwart, these objectives. 0 0
Essentially, the dispute between the en banc majority and the dissent was
over what approach and what standard was to be applied in a Kyne exception
analysis, especially where an examination of the legislative history was called
for. The decision in Fanning emphasized the Kyne exception requirement of a
Board violation of a clear statutory mandate.' 0' More importantly, two
elements of the majority's treatment of the Kyne exception requirement helped
maintain the exception's narrow scope. First, the en banc majority examined
and weighed each provision of the Act and its legislative history separately in
determining whether there was a clear statutory mandate, disregarding the
cumulative effect of the provisions and legislative history. 10 2 Secondly, the en
92 Id. at 13.
93 The group could picket for recognition and very possibly subject itself to a section 8(b)(4)(c) (29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(c) (1976)) ULP charge. Upon issuance of a cease and desist order of the Board, the cer-
tification could be challenged in the court of appeals, pursuant to § 9(d) (29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1976)).
However, under 303(a)(3) (29 U.S.C. § 187(a) (1976)) of the Labor-Management Relations Act a union
which pickets for recognition is subject to a damage suit by the employer. See Comment, Judicial Review of
Certification Proceedings, 73 HARV. L. REV. 217, 220 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as Comment, Certfication
Proceedings]; Comment, Labor Law-Judicial Review-District Court Has No Jurisdiction to Review Certification Pro-
ceedings Where Question Is Essentialy One of Fact, 43 TEx. L. REV. 251, 253 n.23 (1964) [hereinafter referred to
as Comment, District Court Has No Jurisdiction].
94 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 28 (dissent).
95 358 U.S. at 190.
96 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 26-27 (dissent).
97 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
98 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 27 (dissent).
99 Id. at 26-28 (dissent). Boire'involved a determination that a bus company was a joint employer of
maintenance employees within the meaning of section 2(3). The bus company brought suit in district court,
based on the Kyne exception, to enjoin the Board from conducting a representation election. The case even-
tually came before the Supreme Court, which ruled that the question was primarily one of fact and therefore
unreviewable under the Kyne exception. The Court in Boire pointed out the Kyne decision involved a question
of statutory construction, whereas Boire involved the factual finding of the Board that Greyhound was an
employer. The Supreme Court declined to extend the Kyne exception to cases involving factual decisions of
the Board. 376 U.S. at 475-81.
100 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 28-29 (dissent). The purposes of the Act are set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1976).
101 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 7-8 (majority), 7 (dissent).




banc majority implicitly required that the legislative history, to be a clear
statutory mandate, must contain specific language on the issue involved. 0 3 For
this criterion to have been met in Fanning, it appears the court would have re-
quired the legislative history to provide, in effect, that: "House staff are
employees under section 2(3) of the Act."
The cumulative effect approach of Judge Wright's dissent provided for a
more liberal basis on which a clear statutory mandate could be found. Judge
Wright's approach, however, would appear to restrict the use of the Kyne ex-
ception to unions and employees. 10 4
Fanning appears to be the first case in a Kyne exception situation in which
an extensive examination was made of the legislative history. 05 By conducting
more than a facial survey of the Act, the majority and dissent may have un-
necessarily expanded the scope of a Kyne exception analysis. This is particularly
relevant in light of the congressional intent against judicial review of certifica-
tion proceedings, 0 6 the questionable basis on which Kyne was decided, 0 7 and
the stance of the courts that the Kyne exception remain a narrow one.108
A general rule of statutory construction provides that consideration of the
legislative history of a statute is not permissible where the statute is unam-
biguous.10 9 Yet, if recourse to legislative history is necessary in a Kyne excep-
tion analysis, because the statutory section is ambiguous, it appears to be con-
tradictory to say that such a statutory section can be a clear statutory
103 Id. at 12 (majority), 18 (dissent).
104 See notes 127 & 135 infra.
105 An examination of the case law in this area revealed that apparently no court has undertaken a de-
tailed analysis of the legislative history of the Act in determining whether a clear statutory mandate existed.
For the list of cases examined see No. 78-1209, slip op. at 7-8 (majority), 7 n.16, n.17, 9 n.24, 16 n.43 (dis-
sent). Cf Internat'l Ass'n of Tool Craftsmen v. Leedom, 276 F.2d 514, 516 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 815 (1960) (legislative history sufficient to support Board position; no detailed analysis).
106 See note 67 supra.
107 The criticism of the Kyne decision by commentators has generally revolved around its questionable
use of case law and its ignoring of the legislative history. E.g., Leedom v. Kyne 358 U.S. at 191-201 (Bren-
nan,J., dissenting); Polner, supra note 53, at 411; Comment,Judicial Review, supra note 28, at 382-83; Com-
ment, Certification Proceedings, supra note 93, at 221; Comment, Labor Law-Jurisdiction of Federal District Court-
Wrongful Certification of Professionals and Nonprofessionals in One Bargaining Unit- "Obliteration of Right" Theory,
28J. B. A. ST. KAN. 211, 213 (1959); Comment, Equitable Jurisdiction, supra note 37, at 763, 767-69; Com-
ment, Labor Law-Labor Management Relations Act-Jurisdiction of Federal District Court to Set Aside Improper Cer-
tification Order, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1404, 1407-08 (1959). Cf Comment, Labor Law-Jurisdiction-Judicial
Review of NLRB Certification Proceedings, 42 MINN. L. REv. 938, 939-42 (1958); Comment, Labor
Law-Representation Proceedings-Jurisdiction of Federal District Court Over Suit to Set Aside NLRB Certification Order
Made In Violation of Statutory Authority, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 600, 602-04 (1959). Some commentators felt
the Supreme Court had adopted the "presumption ofjudicial review" rationale advocated by the leading
commentator, Jaffe, supra note 34, at that time. E.g., Comment,JudicialReview, supra note 28, at 388; Com-
ment, Certification Proceedings, supra note 93, at 221. For a comprehensive explanation of this "presumption,"
written about the time of the decision, see Jaffe, The Right toJudicial Review (pts. 1 & 2), 71 HARv. L. REv.
401, 769 (1958).
108 See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. at 481; Chicago Truck Drivers v. NLRB, 599 F.2d
816, 819 (7th Cir. 1979); IUERMW v. McCulloch, 345 F.2d 90, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1965); McCulloch v.
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403, F.2d 916, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). For
an exhaustive list of the cases on this point see No. 78-1209, slip op. at 7-8 (majority), 7 nn.16 & 17
(dissent). Cf Cox, The Major Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court October Term 1958, ABA Section of
Labor Relations Law, 1959 Proceedings, reprinted in W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINtSTRATivE LAW 441,
443 (4th ed. 1960)(thought Kyne would cause all Board certification decisions to be reviewable).
109 See, e.g., Wilbur v. United States, 284 U.S. 231, 237 (1931); F.J. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION 9§ 32, 36 & 37, at 62-63, 75-77 (1953); J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
54-55 (4th ed. C. Sands ed. 1973). Cf id. at 182, 415 ("ambiguity is not uniformly insisted upon as a
prerequisite to the use of aids to construction;" in determining whether a provision is mandatory or direc-
tory "all of the pertinent intrinsic and extrinsic aids to construction are applicable").
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mandate. 110 Perhaps the majority's requiring an express statement in the
legislative history addressing the issue involved provides a reasonable com-
promise between these positions.
If such an approach is accepted, it will result in requiring that the Board
examine the legislative history of the Act when making itsfactual determination
of whether members of a certain group are employees under the Act. If the
Board does not consider the legislative history, the Board will be taking the
chance that a court will find a clear statutory mandate. If such were found, the
Board decision would be subject to invalidation, based on the Kyne exception.
Inherent in this discussion is the question of whether the Board should have to
look to the legislative history when making this type of factual
determination. 1 1'
The majority's and dissent's use of Bell Aerospace in Fanning is ques-
tionable."12 The Supreme Court's specific holding in Bell Aerospace was that
managerial employees were not covered by the Act, based on the legislative
history, on the early Board decisions, on the Board's construction of the Act for
twenty years, and on the court of appeals decisions." 3
Reliance on the strict BellAerospace holding would then seem to dictate that
the majority show house staff were meant to be excluded, pursuant to the
legislative history and case law. 1 4 The legislative history, as admitted by the
majority, contains a congressional assumption that house staff would be found
to be employees within the meaning of the Act. 1 5 In Bell Aerospace there had
been other Board rulings and court of appeals decisions on the status of
managerial employees prior to the Board's controversial ruling that managerial
employees were employees under the Act." 6 With respect to house staffs,
however, the Board decided house staff were not employees," 7 and it has never
deviated from that ruling." 8 The Second Circuit, on the other hand, concluded
Congress meant to include house staff under the provisions of the Act. 119
Moreover, the Board ruled house staff were "primarily students"'120 and Board
decisions exist which deal with the question of who is an employee in student
contexts. 12 1 When the Board decisions in the student-employee cases are ap-
plied to the house staff situation, the inclination appears to be towards inclu-
110 See Squillacote v. Int'l Broth. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d. 31, 36 (7th Cir. 1977)(violation of statutory
authority if Board disregards specific and unambiguous statutory directive).
111 Fanning, in his dissent in Cedars-Sinai, criticized the majority for not considering the legislative
history. 223 N.L.R.B. at 257-59.
112 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 9-10 (majority), 20 (dissent).
113 416 U.S. at 289. The dispute between the majority and the dissent on this point could very well hinge
on what the majority means by "policy reasons." No explanation is given by the majority.
In defense of the dissent, a heavy emphasis was placed on the legislative history by the Supreme Court
in Bell Aerospace, and from language in the case it appears the Supreme Court would have made the same
decision based only on the legislative history. See 416 U.S. at 283-84; Comment, Exclusion of Managerial
Employees from the NLRA, 88 HARV. L. REv. 258, 260-61 (1974); Supra note 87.
114 See No. 78-1209, slip op. at 20 (dissent); supra note 113 and accompanying text.
115 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 11 n.6.
116 416 U.S. at 285-89.
117 223 N.L.R.B. at 251.
118 See note 14 supra.
119 566 F.2d at 815.
120 223 N.L.R.B. at 251.
121 See note 83 supra. Several Board decisions have held student-employees to come under the Act. E.g.,
Beecher Ancillary Servs., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 642 (1976); New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 531
(1969); Miller Elec. Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1952).
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sion of house staff under the Act. 122 A Bell Aerospace approach appears then to
lead to the conclusion that house staff should not have been excluded.
Even though a court could find, under Bell Aerospace, -that house staff are
covered under the Act, Bell Aerospace did not involve an application of the Kyne
exception, but consisted of judicial review pursuant to sections 9(d) and 10
(f).123 In these circumstances, therefore, the Bell Aerospace approach would not
apply.
This does not mean that since the Board found house staff to have
employee characteristics the Board must classify them as employees. The fac-
tual determination of who is an employee under section 2(3) is left to the
Board's discretion. 124 A logical argument could be made that since the entire
factual determination is discretionary with the Board, whether or not enough
employee traits are exhibited to qualify a group for inclusion under section 2(3)
is a decision within that discretion. The Board could then consistently find that
a group had certain employee characteristics and yet were not employees under
the Act.
Judge Wright's reliance on Boire to support the relevancy of his third fac-
tor, whether there was any realistic hope of judicial review for the party
challenging the Board action, also appears questionable. The Court in Boire
discussed the review process in certification proceedings, but only as a prelude
to their discussion of what was required to sustain district court jurisdiction
pursuant to the Kyne exception.1 25 A focus on the "deprivation of an effective
remedy' '1 26 in Boire would have led to the conclusion that the employer had a
viable alternative remedy. 27 As a result, Boire's use in this case is minimized.
Possible support for a "deprivation of an effective remedy" factor can be
found, however, in Congress' intent to restrict judicial review in certification
proceedings.128 The rationale behind this position was to prevent stall tactics
and promote collective bargaining.129 But this rationale would not appear ap-
plicable to cases where the Board refuses to certify a union, as was the case in
Fanning. Collective bargaining cannot be delayed, because it is never allowed to
begin. 30
Judge Wright also felt that since the refusal to certify a union is essentially
nonreviewable, it should be considered a final order subject to challenge in the
122 See Speech by D'Alba, supra note I I at 20-22..Cf The Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B.
621 (1974). See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. at 255 n. 14 (Fanning, dissent) (effective discus-
sion distinguishing Leland).
123 See notes 28-31 and accompanying text. In BellAerospace, the company refused to bargain and a ULP
order was issued. The company was ordered to bargain and then petitioned for review of that order. 416
U.S. at 269-72.
124 See note 44 supra.
125 376 U.S. at 476-79.
126 358 U.S. at 190.
127 By refusing to bargain with the certified union, the bus company could have illicited a ULP order.
Incidental to review of this order, the bus company could have received judicial review of the certification
proceeding and it would have exhausted its administrative remedies. By ruling on the bus company's claim
on its merits, the Supreme Court implied the Kyne exception was available to employers. 376 U.S. at 477;
Comment, District Court Has No Jurisdiction, supra note 93, at 253. Cf Comment,Judicial Review, supra note
28, at 383 (judicial review is never within the control of the parties).
128 The congressional intent was clearly to restrict judicial review in certification proceedings. Supra note
67.
129 Id. An amendment proposed by the house argued forjudicial review on grounds similar to those used
by Judge Wright. H. R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-57 (1947).
130 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 29 (dissent).
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courts.131 It appears that Judge Wright sees no difference between the certifica-
tion decision in this case and final orders entered by other federal agencies.
Although final agency orders are normally reviewable, judicial review can be
denied by the courts when there is a clear congressional intent to do so.1 32 Since
the congressional intent is clear here that judicial review is to be denied, 133 the
substance of this line of reasoning is dissipated.
Finally, Judge Wright's reasoning, that certification of house staff associa-
tions would accomplish, rather than thwart, the Act's objectives, is
simplistic. 134 If followed it would prevent the Board from ever denying cer-
tification without opening itself to the argument it is thwarting.the purposes of
the Act. 3 -1 A Board decision not to certify a union would always be contrary to
the objectives of the Act, because a refusal by the Board to certify a union
eliminates collective bargaining for that union and could lead to a disruptive
recognition strike.
The Kyne exception, at this point in its development, is sorely in need of
clarification. The Supreme Court has not dealt with the Kyne exception since
1964.136 Serious, unanswered questions have developed since then as to the
proper method, scope, and factors to be considered in a Kyne exception
analysis. These questions are susceptible to more than one answer and the
lower federal courts have adopted an unsatisfactory piecemeal approach in
analyzing Kyne exception questions. 137 The five to four decision of the court of
appeals in Fanning is indicative of the disagreement caused by the lack of any
clear guidance by the Supreme Court in this area. Fanning provides the
Supreme Court with the ideal vehicle with which it can clarify the approach to
be taken in Kyne exception cases.
Jon D. Ehlinger
Antitrust-FIRST AMENDMENT-POLITICAL BOYCOTTS ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE
OF THE SHERMAN ACT AND PRIVILEGED UNDER THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT-Missouri v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.
1980)*
In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,' the Supreme Court of the United
131 Id. at 28 (dissent).
132 Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
139-41 (1967); 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976).
133 See note 28 supra.
134 No. 78-1209, slip op. at 29 (dissent).
135 An employer suit at this stage would also delay collective bargaining. A heavy emphasis on this factor
would then, in effect, prohibit an employer from invoking district court jurisdiction in certification pro-
ceedings, based on the Kyne exception. This result would be contrary to the Supreme Court's position in
Boire of allowing employer suits, provided the Board has acted outside its statutory authority. 376 U.S. 473.
136 Id.
137 In Fanning, the majority and dissent developed different approaches. See text accompanying notes
101-04 supra. See also Chicago Truck Drivers v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 1979) (examination of
whether the Board violated a specific statutory directive "should be made with relatively lax scrutiny");
McCulloch v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F.2d 916, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Miami Newspaper
Printing Pressmen's Union v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (applies to positive commands as
well as negative prohibitions); National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 375 F. Supp. 421, 429-30 (E.D. Pa.),
aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
* Cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1980) (No. 79-2037).
1 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
[December 1980]
COMMENTS
States labeled the Sherman Act 2 the Magna Carta of our economic system. It
is, the Court stated, "as important to . . . free-enterprise . . . as the Bill of
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.' '3 Thus, it is
clear that the Supreme Court attaches great importance to the economic
freedoms promoted by the Sherman Act. When enforcement of the Act in-
fringes upon first amendment rights, however, this clarity quickly fades.
In Missouri v. National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW),4 economic
freedom and the first amendment right to petition the government collide. The
dispute resulted from a campaign conducted by the National Organization for
Women (NOW) discouraging groups from holding conferences and conven-
tions in states that had not yet ratified the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment.5 Missouri's convention trade suffered economic harm as a result
of the NOW boycott. 6 Missouri brought suit against NOW charging that its
boycott violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, 7 violated Missouri antitrust
law,8 and constituted tortious infliction of economic harm. 9 The district court
ruled in favor of NOW on all issues. 10 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the NOW boycott was a political ac-
tivity outside the scope of antitrust legislation and protected under the first
amendment right to petition."'
In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit first examined the legislative
history of the Sherman Act.12 Although it discovered no affirmative statement
of intent, the court concluded-that the legislative history indicated an intent to
regulate the activities of competitors in commerce rather than the activities of
"noncompetitors motivated socially or politically in connection with legisla-
tion.'' 1 3
Turning to the case law,' 4 the Eighth Circuit sought additional guidance
from the Supreme Court decision of Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 15 In
2 15 U.S.C. 55 1-7 (1976).
3 405 U.S. at 610.
4 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1980) (No. 79-2037).
5 The proposed twenty-seventh amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro-
visions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
6 The Supreme Court has defined boycott as "a method of pressuring a party with whom one has a
dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to withhold, patronage or services from the target." St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541 (1978). See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 169 (5th ed. 1979).
7 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal."
8 Mo. REv. STAT. § 416.031.1 (1969).
9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766B, 767 (1977).
10 Missouri v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
11 620 F.2d at 1319; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12 620 F.2d at 1304-09, quoting I E. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES (1978).
13 620 F.2d at 1309.
14 The Eighth Circuit considered NOWa case of first impression. But see Council of Defense v. Interna-
tional Magazine Co., 267 F. 390 (8th Cir. 1920). In that case, the Council of Defense organized a boycott of
a publishing company to protest the political views of stockholder William Randolph Hearst. The Eighth
Circuit held the boycott to be within the proscriptions of the Sherman Act. The NOW court distinguished
this case by pointing out: 1) the Council of Defense boycott was intended to punish the publisher for his past ac-
tions while the NOW boycott was intended to apply economic pressure to achieve future action; and 2)
Council of Defense did not involve the right to petition. 620 F.2d at 1304 n.4. The dissent found these distinc-
tions to be without merit. 620 F.2d at 1324 n.17.
15 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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Klor's, an appliance retailer charged that a competitor had conspired with
several manufacturers to limit the availability of their appliances to the plain-
tiff. Ruling for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court indicated that group boycotts
were within the class of restraints condemned as per se violations5 6 of the Sher-
man Act. The Eighth Circuit distinguished Klor's from NOW by pointing out
that Klor's involved a commercial boycott among competitors while the NOW
boycott was a politically motivated attempt to influence legislation. The
Supreme Court's language in Klor's supports this political-commercial distinc-
tion by recognizing that the Sherman Act "is aimed primarily at combinations
having commercial objectives and is applied only to a very limited extent to
organizations, like labor unions, which normally have other objectives."' 7
The Eighth Circuit found more direct support for its decision in Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. (Noerr). 8 In Noerr, a
group of railroads coordinated a publicity campaign designed to encourage
legislation harmful to the trucking industry. The campaign was conducted us-
ing a "third party" technique, whereby the anti-trucking propaganda ap-
peared to originate from civic groups with no commercial interest in the pro-
posed legislation. Despite the railroads' anticompetitive purpose and deceptive
tactics, the Supreme Court declared that "no violation of the [Sherman] Act
can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement
of laws."' 19 The Supreme Court rested its decision on three factors: 1) the
"essential dissimilarity" between the railroads' attempts to influence legisla-
tion and agreements traditionally condemned by the Sherman Act; 2) the
government's need to be informed; and 3) the important constitutional ques-
tions which would be raised by construing the Sherman Act as regulating a
political activity. 20 In a subsequent case, California Motor Transport Co. v. Truck-
ing Unlimited,21 the Supreme Court indicated that the Noerr exclusion from an-
titrust regulation was primarily based upon the first amendment right to peti-
tion.
Applying Noerr to NOW, the Eighth Circuit found that "the crux of the
issue is that NOW was politically motivated to use a boycott to influence
ratification of the ERA. '"22 The political motivation of the NOW boycott
brought it within the overriding policy implications of Noerr. As the Supreme
Court stated in Noerr:
16 Id. at 211-12. Per se violations of the Sherman Act "are certain agreements or practices which
because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively pre-
sumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50
(1976) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). For an examination of the per se
rule as applied to boycotts, see Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripefor Reexamination,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1979); Woolley, Is a Boycott a Per Se Violation of the Antitrust Laws? 27 RUTOERS L.
REV. 773 (1974). See also note 38 infra.
17 359 U.S. at 213 n.7 (dictum).
18 365 U.S. 127 (1961). For a general discussion of Noerr and its progeny, see Fischel, Antitrust Liability
for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctine, 45 U. OHi. L. REV.
80 (1977); Holzer, An Analysis for Reconciling the Antitrust Laws with the Right to Petition: Noerr-Pennington in
Light of Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 27 EMORY L.J. 673 (1978).
19 365 U.S. at 135.
20 Id. at 136-38. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have expanded the Noerr exemption from antitrust
regulation to include attempts to influence administrative agencies, UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965), and the courts, California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
21 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
22 620 F.2d at 1314.
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The proscriptions of the [Sherman] Act, tailored as they are for the business
world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena. Con-
gress has traditionally exercised extreme caution in legislating with respect to
problems relating to the conduct of political activities, a caution which has
been reflected in the decisions of this Court interpreting such legislation. 23
From its examination of the legislative history and the case law, the Eighth Cir-
cuit concluded that the Sherman Act was inapplicable and that the first amend-
ment right to use political activities to petition the government shielded the
NOW boycott from liability for antitrust violations or common law trade
restraints .24
The foundation of the Eighth Circuit's opinion in NOW is the district
court's finding that "[t]he goal and sole purpose of NOW's economic boycott
campaign is the ratification of the ERA. "25 The district court correctly
distinguished between the intent and the purpose of the boycott. 26 Although the
intent of the boycott may have been to inflict economic injury on Missouri's
convention trade, 27 its underlying purpose was ratification of the ERA. 28 The
intended anticompetitive effects of the boycott were, therefore, incidental to the
primary political purpose of the boycott. The Supreme Court made a similar
distinction in Noerr, stating:
[T]he findings of the District Court that the railroads' campaign was intended
to and did in fact injure the truckers in their relationships . ..with their
customers can mean no more than that the truckers sustained some direct in-
jury as an incidental effect of the railroads' campaign to influence governmen-
tal action .... 29
Although Noerr and NOW are factually dissimilar, in both cases the injury in-
flicted can be viewed as an ancillary effect of a political act.
In dissent, ChiefJudge Gibson criticized the majority's treatment of Noerr.
Citing Supreme Court decisions which emphasize the expansive interpretation
given the Sherman Act 30 and the presumption against implied exemptions
from the Act,3 ' the dissent contended that Noerr must be narrowly construed. 32
23 356 U.S. at 141.
24 620 F.2d at 1319. In Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1074 (1980), the Fifth Circuit considered the first amendment implications of political boycotts. The court in
Henyy restrained enforcement of a state court injunction prohibiting picketing associated with civil rights
boycotts, noting:
There is no suggestion that the . . .defendants were in competition with the white businesses
.... On the contrary, the boycott grew out of a racial dispute with the white merchants and the
city government .... This differentiates this case from a boycott organized for economic ends,
for speech to protest racial discrimination is essential political speech lying at the core of the First
Amendment.
Id. at 303. Due to the procedural posture of the case, the Fifth Circuit did not propose a scheme for reconcil-
ing a state's interest in regulating economic activity with first amendment rights. Nonetheless, the court's
deference to the first amendment in this context is noteworthy.
25 620 F.2d at 1302 (paraphrase of district court findings, 467 F. Supp. at 295).
26 See Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 705 (1962).
27 Id. at 1303 (paraphrase of district court findings, 467 F. Supp. at 295).
28 Id. at 1302.
29 365 U.S. at 143.
30 City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978); Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
31 City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
32 620 F.2d at 1319-21 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).
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The dissent highlighted the factual variations, asserting that "[t]he Noerr case
was a combination to get legislation harmful to others. The NOWcase is a com-
bination to harm others to get legislation." 3 3 Viewing this distinction as fun-
damental, Chief Judge Gibson found the majority's reliance on Noerr unwar-
ranted.
The dissent's arguments are not without merit. Although Noerr supports
the majority's position, it is not controlling. In contrast with NOW, Noerr in-
volved no boycott. The railroads in Noerr lobbied in favor of legislation which
would have improved their competitive position vis-a-vis the trucking industry.
The Supreme Court found the form of the railroads' activities (regardless of
their purpose) rendered the Sherman Act inapplicable.3 4 In NOW, the Eighth
Circuit found that the political purpose of the ERA boycott immunized the
boycott from antitrust liability.33 While admitting that Noerr was not
dispositive, 36 the majority failed to clearly state that the NOWdecision was not
simply an extension of Noerr. NOW should be read not as expanding the Noerr
doctrine, 37 but rather as establishing an independent doctrine which accords
noncompetitive, political boycotts antitrust immunity when the boycotts' sole
purpose is to influence governmental action. Under this approach, NOW
stands on its own merits and cannot be dismissed as an unwarranted extension
of another case.
The central objection of the dissent in NOW concerned not the relevance
of Noerr but the failure of the majority to do the "requisite" first amendment
analysis.3 8 The dissent did not propose that the NOW boycott be summarily
condemned as a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 39 Rather, it criticized the
majority's failure to undertake a more comprehensive balancing of the govern-
ment's interest in regulating interstate commerce and the public's interest in
using political boycotts to influence legislation. 40 Support for this balancing of
first amendment rights against governmental interests can be found in Buckley
33 Id. at 1323 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting) (quoting brief for appellant at 31).
34 365 U.S. at 136-40. In a subsequent case expanding Noerr Justice White stated, Noerr shields from
the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose .. " UMW v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (emphasis added).
35 See notes 22 and 25 supra and accompanying text.
36 620 F.2d at 1315.
37 Two recent commentators have interpreted NOW as an attempt by the Eighth Circuit to extend the
Noerr doctrine. See Cockerill, Application of Noerr-Pennington and the First Amendment to Politically Motivated
Economic Boycotts: Missouri v. NOW, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 85 (1979); Comment, Protest Boycotts Under the Sher-
man Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1131 (1980).
38 620 F.2d 1319. See Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 659 (1978).
39 The Supreme Court's language in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959),
however, indicates that group boycotts fall within the per se rule. See note 16 supra. Reasoning from this
basis, one commentator has contended that all boycotts should be treated as per se violations of the Sherman
Act regardless of their motivation. See Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals to Deal,
1970 DUKE L.J. 247. However, the Supreme Court's holdings in boycott cases have been narrow enough to
permit several courts to avoid application of the per se rule under appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Smith
v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1177-91 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Feminist Women's Health Center v.
Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 546-47 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Worthen Bank & Trust
Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 127-30 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918
(1974); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76-80 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). Some commentators have concluded that group boycotts in a noncommer-
cial context may not merit per se treatment. See Bauer, supra note 16; McCormick, Group Boycott-Per Se or
Not Per Se, That Is the Question, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 685 (1979); Comment, supra note 37.
40 620 F.2d at 1324-25 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting). It should be noted that the dissent fails to articulate
any particular scheme of analysis, but argues instead for remanding the case to the district court with in-
structions to apply a balancing test to the first amendment issue.
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v. Valeo, 1 United States v. O'Brien,42 and other Supreme Court decisions. 43 The
dissent concluded that a balancing analysis was required "to assure consistent
evaluation of similar claims .... ',44
Although the NOW majority failed to address the issue, the wisdom of
employing a balancing test in this situation is questionable. A court faced with
the task of applying such a test would have to weigh the potential competitive
harms of the boycott against the political benefits which the boycotters are seek-
ing to attain. Economic effects are susceptible to reasoned analysis, but the
standard by which the importance of political goals is measured is at best sub-
jective. Courts attempting this balancing act would have little to guide them
apart from the dominant social and political mores of the day and their in-
dividual prejudices. The balancing test suggested by the dissent would be dif-
ficult to apply to political boycotts and would inevitably lead to divergent
results in similar cases, thereby creating the impression of judicial ar-
bitrariness. 45
A recent commentator on the NOW decision 46 contends that the Sherman
Act is applicable to social and political boycotts, and that all such "protest
boycotts ' 47 should be analyzed under the rule of reason. First enunciated in
Standard Oil Co. v. United-States,48 the rule of reason does little more than instruct
the court to examine all relevant circumstances surrounding a particular
restraint in order to determine whether in fact the restraint is "unreasonably
restrictive of competitive conditions. 49 Under the rule of reason the purpose
for which an economic restraint is imposed can be considered only as evidence
of the restraint's probable effect on competition. 50 The commentator asserts
that, due to their lack of anticompetitive purpose, most protest boycotts should
enjoy a presumption of reasonableness. 51
Rule of reason analysis appears to eliminate the inconsistencies inherent
41 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
42 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
43 Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
44 620 F.2d at 1324.
45 See Bird, supra note 39, at 277-82. Bird argues that the difficulties inherent in applying a balancing
test militate in favor of per se treatment of political boycotts.
46 Comment, supra note 37.
47 See Comment, supra note 37, at 1133. This commentator defines protest boycott as a "concerted
refusal to deal motivated by a political, social, religious, or other noncommercial purpose .... [T]he par-
ticipants in a protest boycott lack . . . [a] commercial objective to achieve an effect traditionally held
violative of the Sherman Act .... [and] lack a significant business interest that might be advanced by the
boycotting activity."
48 221 U.S. 1(1911).
49 Id. at 58. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade articulated the
rule of reason as follows:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains .... The true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby pro-
motes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To deter-
mine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts.
Id. at 238.
50 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
51 Comment, supra note 37 at 1157.
[Vol. 56:306]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
in a subjective balancing test by allowing the boycott's purpose to be assessed
only as evidence of its potential anticompetitive effect. It is clear upon closer
examination, however, that the inconsistencies are not eliminated. Due to the
amorphous nature of the rule of reason,5 2 courts applying it may fail to
distinguish between a boycott's intent, which is anticompetitive, and its pur-
pose, which may be unrelated to any economic restraint. 53 Such a failure would
lend uncertainty to any evaluation of a political boycott based upon the rule of
reason. In addition, whether or not political boycotts are afforded a presump-
tion of reasonableness, the courts retain a great deal of discretion in determin-
ing when a restraint shall be deemed "unreasonably restrictive" 5 and
therefore violative of the antitrust laws. In practice, application of the rule of
reason to political boycotts would result in ad hoc judicial determinations
plagued both by the complexities, inherent in antitrust litigation and the sub-
jective nature of the values underpinning any political goal.
An additional problem with applying the rule of reason or any balancing
test is that the success of a political boycott will be a major factor in determin-
ing its legality. A well-organized boycott will naturally have a greater economic
impact than a mismanaged one, a fact which may tip the balance against the
boycott's legality. Under this analysis, political boycotts could well be accept-
able only if unsuccessful. It seems anomalous to allow boycotts to be used in the
political arena with the sole proviso that they be ineffective.
The majority's position in NOW avoids the inconsistencies inherent in a
balancing test by focusing on the purpose underlying the boycott. The trial
court assumes responsibility for determining the purpose behind the refusal to
deal. When the purpose is found to be solely political, the boycott is shielded
from antitrust liability. This approach preserves the right to use political
boycotts to influence legislation.
In practical terms, the structure of our government does not afford or-
dinary citizens a wide variety of means to influence effectively the political
system. Boycotts are among the few non-violent methods by which less power-
ful members of society can effectuate constructive change. By eliminating the
right to use boycotts in a political context, the courts would enhance the sense
of impotence widely felt by middle-class Americans. The alternative-allowing
political boycotts only if they are incapable of having a significant impact-is
hardly an acceptable compromise.
The Eighth Circuit held in NOW that political boycotts designed to in-
fluence legislation are beyond the scope of the antitrust laws and protected by
the first amendment right to petition.55 Although the court may have relied too
extensively on Noerr, its conclusions merit support. By focusing on the purpose
of the boycott, a trial court can determine the applicability of antitrust regula-
tions. This approach avoids the subjective balancing of governmental interests
with private political interests and preserves the right to use political boycotts to
influence governmental policy.
Robert G. Homchick
52 See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
53 See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
54 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
55 620 F.2d at 1319.
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Civil Procedure-FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 55(E) IS TO BE STRICT-
LY APPLIED IN DISABILITY BENEFIT APPEALS DESPITE THE COURT'S POWER TO
COMPEL GOVERNMENT COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS-Alameda v. Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare, 622 F.2d 1044 (1st Cir. 1980).
If a defendant fails to answer a complaint in timely fashion, the district
court can find the defendant in default and enter a default judgment. In cases
involving the federal government, however, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
55(e)' requires the district court to look to the merits of the dispute before
entering a default judgment. 2
Although the courts have consistently favored the government in cases
challenging the rule, 3 the United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico entered a default judgment against the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare4 (the Secretary; HEW) for refusing to file requested memoranda
thereby delaying review of denial of disability benefits. The district court
entered the default judgment without passing on the evidence in the ad-
ministrative transcript.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit con-
sidered whether the district court had the authority to strike the denials in the
Secretary's untimely answer, find the claimants entitled to benefits, and re-
mand the cases back to the Secretary for computation of benefits. The First
Circuit held that the district court order amounted to a default judgment under
rule 55(e), and that as such, the order could not be entered without examining
the merits of the case using the accepted standard of review., Although sup-
ported by the case law, 6 the accepted standard of review found in section 405(g)
of the Social Security Act, 7 and rule 55(e), the decision allows the Secretary to
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 55(e) states that"[n]o judgment by default shall be entered against the United States
or an officer or agent thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfac-
tory to the court."
2 The district court must satisfy itself that the claimant has established "his claim or right to relief by
evidence satisfactory to the court." FED. R. Civ. P. 55(e).
3 Williams v. Califano, 593 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1979); Poe v. Mathews, 572 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1978);
Carroll v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 470 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1972); Campbell v. Eastland, 307
F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962).
4 Santiago v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 463 F. Supp. 759, aff'don rehearing 82 F.R.D. 164
(D.P.R. 1979). The agency is no longer designated Health, Education and Welfare, and has been renamed
the Department of Health and Human Services as prescribed by S 601 of Pub. L. 96-88, tit. VI, 93 Stat. 696
(October 17, 1979).
5 Alameda v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 622 F.2d 1044, 1047 (1st Cir. 1980). The stan-
dard of review is found in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and (h) (1976), which provides in
pertinent part:
(g) Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he
was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a
civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such
decision . . . . Such action shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the
judicial district in which plaintiff resides .... As part of his answer the Secretary shall file a cer-
tified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and deci-
sions complained of are based. The court shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and
transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Secretary, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. The findings of the Secretary as to
any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....
(h) No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal,
or governmental agency except as herein provided.
6 See note 3 supra.
7 See note 5 supra.
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use a procedural rule to circumvent the broad social policies behind the Social
Security Act8 and evades discussion of several relevant issues.
Alameda involved seven cases consolidated at the district court level for
purposes of appeal. The facts in each case were similar. The claimants had
filed for disability benefits and were denied the benefits at the local level. After
exhausting their administrative appeals, 9 the claimants requested a review of
the decision by the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
under section 405(g).10
The chronology of events in Santiago v. Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare"l typifies the situations in the cases ultimately consolidated by the
district court for appeal. In July of 1978, the district court established a
timetable for submitting pleadings and supporting memoranda. The timetable
gave the Secretary sixty days to answer and ninety days to file memoranda to
aid the court in reviewing the administrative transcript. The Secretary missed
the deadline for filing both the answer (September) and the ordered supporting
memoranda (October). The district court then, sua sponte, granted the
Secretary ten more days to respond. One week after the new deadline, the
Secretary filed an answer. By December, the court had not received the
memoranda ordered to be filed by October.12 The district court again gave the
Secretary another ten days in which to file the requested memoranda. Thirty
days later, in January of 1979, the district court issued a four part order requir-
ing that (1) the allegations in each of the complaints be taken as established; (2)
the denials in the Secretary's answer be stricken; (3) the clerk enter judgment
granting the relief prayed for by the claimants; and (4) the cases be remanded
to the Secretary for computation of benefits.' 3
One week later, unaware the default judgment had even been entered, the
Secretary requested a fifteen day extension to file the memoranda. The
district court denied the motion for additional time because of the previous
default judgment. The Secretary finally filed the memoranda in February.
Similar situations existed in the other cases before the district court.' 4
The Secretary moved under rule 60(b) to vacate the judgments, 15 arguing
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396 (1976).
9 Santiago v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 82 F.R.D. at 164.
10 See note 5 supra.
11 82 F.R.D. at 165-66.
12 [The Secretary's] sole approach to the court lay in repetitive boilerplate requests:
"1. Defendant would like to file memorandum of law prior to the adjudication of this case
by the Court, in support of the allegations contained in his answer to the complaint.
"2. Due to the enormous litigation of Social Security cases defendant needs some time to
prepare his brief."
Whereupon defendant usually sought sixty more days.
Alameda v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 622 F.2d 1044, 1046 (1st Cir. 1980).
13 Santiago v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 463 F. Supp. at 759.
14 The district court randomly surveyed nine other Social Security appeals and found four, five and six
month delays before an answer was filed, and a similar time elapsing before any legal memoranda were
filed. Santiago v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 82 F.R.D. at 164.
15 FED. R. Civ. P. 60 reads in pertinent part:
Relief From Judgment or Order
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal represen-
tative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons; (1) mistake, in-
advertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence . . . ; (3) fraud ....
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
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that the order amounted to a default judgment under rule 55(e). According to
the Secretary, the district court had no authority to enter the judgment without
first reviewing the merits of the claimant's case. In addition, the Secretary con-
tended the order contravened the section 4 05(g) standard of review. Finally,
the Secretary boldly asserted she was under no duty to file the requested
memoranda. 56
The district court took the position that the Secretary had simply
disregarded lawful court orders with neither explanation nor excuse.' 7 In the
court's opinion, the Secretary unnecessarily protracted the proceedings to the
disadvantage of the claimants awaiting review. 18 The court refused to tolerate
"contumacious disregard of its orders by any litigant."' 9 .Looking to the
remedial nature of the Social Security Act, the court contended it had the in-
herent power to deal with the Secretary's inaction by'imposing the severe sanc-
tion of a default judgment. 20 Although it understood the mandates of rule 55(e)
and section 405(g), 2t the court felt the interests of justice would not be served
by their application.
The district court classified its order as a sanction rather than a default
judgment.2 2 The court conceded, however, that for all practical purposes the
order was a default judgment. 23 As authority for its action the court cited Local
Rule 29 of the District Court of Puerto Rico. 24 Local Rule 29 pertains ex-,
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged ... ; or (6) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be'made within a reasonable time, and for
reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken.
16 To establish disability and maintain the right to benefits under the Social Security Act, the wage
earner must adduce medical proof of the disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1976). When a claimant applies for
benefits, the initial determination of eligibility is made at the local Social Security Office. If the claim is
denied at that level, the claimant may then request a de nova hearing before the appropriate state agency to
reconsider the adverse decision at the local level. This request is decided on evidence presented in affidavits
and supporting briefs. If the claim is again denied, the claimant is entitled to a hearing before an ad-
ministrative law judge of the Social Security Bureau of Hearings and Appeals. 42 U.S.C. 5 405(b) 1976.
This requires a personal appearance and a full evidentiary hearing. (It is the administrative transcript com-
piled at this hearing which the district court in Alameda failed to review.) If the claimant is unsuccessful in
this hearing he may request a reconsideration at the administrative level, and finally judicial review. 42
U.S.C. § 4 05 (g) (1976); See Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978); See alsoJ. MASHAW, C. GOETZ,
F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL, M. CARROW, SOCIAL SEcuRITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 127
(1978) [hereinafter cited asJ. MASHAW]. The process is tedious and time eonsuming.J. MASHAW, id. at 1-4.
Should the review process reach the stage of judicial review, legal costs become significant.
Judicial review is limited by 42 U.S.C. §§ 4 0 5(g) and (h) (1976). The district court may not hold a de
novo evidentiary hearing, but is bound by the evidence in the transcript. Bush v. Celebrezze, 239 F. Supp.
688 (D. Or. 1965); Holland v. Celebrezze, 223 F. Supp. 347 (E. D. Tenn. 1963); Julian v. Folsom, 160 F.
Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The burden of proof is on the claimant to establish that the Secretary's findings
of fact are not supported by "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. 5 423(d)(5) (1976); Reyes Robles v. Finch,
409 F.2d 84 (1st Cir. 1969). If this burden is not met, the Secretary's findings of fact are deemed conclusive.
42 U.S.C. § 4 05 (g) (1976).
17 Santiago v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 463 F. Supp. 759, 760 (D.P.R. 1979).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id., 82 F.R.D. at 166.
21 See note 5 supra.
22 Santiago v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 82 F.R.D. 164, 166 (D.P.R. 1979).
23 Id.
24 Local Rule 29 of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, provides in perti-
nent part:
B) The defendant (the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare) shall have sixty (60)
days to answer the complaint and to file the administrative transcripts of the administrative pro-.
ceedings. Defendant will not be granted any extension to answer the complaint in excess of thirty
(30) days.
C) The time within which defendant has to file his memorandum shall be ninety (90) days
from the date of the filing of the answer to the complaint.
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clusively to Social Security cases and allows the imposition of sanctions if the
Secretary fails to meet established deadlines. Although Local Rule 29 is silent
as to the evidentiary review required before a default judgment may be entered
against the Secretary, the court concluded the exercise of such power was
necessary because the Secretary had violated policies behind the Social Securi-
ty Act. 25 The Secretary's motion to vacate the default judgment was denied,
and the Secretary appealed to the First Circuit.
Although recognizing the inherent remedial powers of the court, the First
Circuit considered itself bound by the strictures of rule 55(e), sections 4 05(g)
and (h), and prior case law. 26 The First Circuit did agree, however, that the
Secretary's inaction was frustrating27 and that the district court had the
authority to require memoranda to be submitted to aid in reviewing the ad-
ministrative transcripts. 28 Nevertheless, the court found that the district court
order amounted to a default judgment under rule 55(e), and therefore, the
district court was required to review the administrative transcript before enter-
ing any judgment against the Secretary. 29
The First Circuit did make one concession to the district court. Since the
Secretary had defaulted under rule 55(a)30 for "failure to otherwise defend,"
the court noted that upon remand the amount and quality of the evidence that
the district court would need to review would be less than would have been re-
quired had no default occurred. 31 The court then remanded the case to have
the district court examine the claimants' memoranda to determine whether the
findings of fact in the administrative transcript were supported by substantial
evidence.32
The First Circuit felt its decision struck an equitable balance between the
four competing interests involved: (1) the social and statutory aim of processing
claims with reasonable expedition; (2) the social security claimant's burden; (3)
the court's interest in guaranteeing that the adversary process functions; and
D) No extension beyond ninety (90) days will be granted to the defendant to comply with
the provisions of (C) above.
Failure of any party to comply with the terms herein established may subject the offending
party to appropriate sanctions including dismissal of the complaint, remand of the case for com-
putation and payment of benefits pending final outcome of the proceedings, disciplinary action
against attorneys and such other measures as justice may require.
Out of the 94 judicial districts, only Puerto Rico has a rule as extensive as this. Puerto Rico's heavy
disability review case load is the reason. Between 1969 and 1973, the Puerto Rico district handled six per-
cent of the nation's social security cases. SeeJ. MASHAW, supra note 16, at 127.
25 Santiago v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 463 F. Supp. 759, 760 (D.P.R. 1979).
26 Williams v. Califano, 593 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1979); Poe v. Mathews, 572 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1978);
Carroll v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 470 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1972).
27 Alameda v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 622 F.2d 1044, 1046 (1st Cir. 1980).
28 Id. at 1047.
29 Id.
30 FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a) provides that "[w]hen a party against whom ajudgment for affirmative relief
is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter his default." The entry of default is similar to a finding of liabili-
ty, but is not a final judgment. The final judgment is the entering of a default judgment upon request of the
responsive party. See MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, §§ 55.02(3), 55.03(1) (1976).
31 -Alameda v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 622 F.2d 1044, 1048 (1st Cir. 1980). A two step
process is involved. First, a default is entered against the unresponsive party. Second, a default judgment is
entered, either by the court or the clerk.
32 If the findings of fact in the administrative transcript are unsupported by substantial evidence, a
reversal or modification of the Secretary's decision will stand.
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(4) the taxpayer's interest in minimizing payment of unsubstantiated claims
due to the government's default. 33
The First Circuit saw no inconsistency between the requirements of rule
55(e) and Local Rule 29 if an evidentiary examination is undertaken. 34 Since
the local rule is silent on the matter of weighing evidence before entering a
default judgment against the Secretary, the appellate court considered the rule
consistent with both the Social Security Act and rules of procedure provided
the district court evaluates the evidence in accordance with the guidelines
established by the appellate court's opinion.
The Alameda decision has two important ramifications. First, the decision
allows the Secretary to invoke a procedural rule to avoid compliance with
lawful court orders, knowing the administrative transcript will be reviewed
before a final decision is rendered. A denial of benefits case will thus be decided
on its merits regardless of the Secretary's conduct, and claimants will en-
counter unnecessary delays. Such a result circumvents the policies behind the
Social Security Act. Second, the court's opinion avoids several relevant issues
because the appellate court viewed the case as simply presenting a rule 55(e)
question. A broader approach might have led the court to affirm the district
court's action. The question presented in Alameda required more than a mere
categorization of the order as a defaultjudgment. Four factors justify ajudicial-
ly recognized exception to the requirements of rule 55(e).
First, the issue in Alameda is more meaningful when examined in the con-
text of the Social Security Act's legislative intent.35 The Act was signed into law
on August 14, 1935.36 Over the past 45 years, the Act has been amended
repeatedly. In 1956 the disability section was added under Title 11. 3 7 The
benefits granted under this section are financed by revenue derived from
employer and employee payroll taxes. 38
In 1935 the Act's Congressional intent was to provide a measure of securi-
ty to Americans in cases of old age or disability. 39 The underlying policy objec-
33 Alameda v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 622 F.2d 1044, 1047 (1st Cir. 1980).
34 Id. at 1049.
35 Although the legislative intent is not binding on the court, it provides a useful starting point for pur-
poses of analysis.
36 At that time the Act consisted of four titles. Title I dealt with grants to the states for the needy aged;
title II involved old age social insurance benefits; title III involved unemployment compensation to be
financed by the states; and title IV involved state grants for aid to dependent children and others. For a brief
historical overview, see R. CAMPBELL, SOCIAL SECURITY: PROMISE AND REALITY, 3-6 (1977).
37 70 Stat. 815, 42 U.S.C. 5 423. Eighty to ninety percent of all social security actions commenced in
the district courts are disability actions. J. MASHAW, supra note 16, at 126.
38 26 U.S.C. 55 3101(a), 3111(a) (1976), 42 U.S.C. 5 401(b) (1976). The program provides monthly
benefits to disabled persons who have worked long enough to have an insured status, and who have had
substantial work experience in a specified interval directly preceding the onset of disability. 42 U.S.C.
55 423(c)(1)(A), (B) (1976). The claimants under title II, on the whole, tend to be from the lower socio-
economic groups. J. MASHAW, supra note 16, at 29.
39 See remarks of Rep. Ellenbogen, May 20, 1935: "Social Security legislation is designed to take the
fear out of life. It is designed to remove the fear of insecurity arising from old age. It is designed to remove
the fear arising from unemployment. It is designed to remove the fear arising from illness." 79 CONG. REC.
7839 (1935); see also 79 CONG. REC. 8223 (remarks of Sen. Thomas), 12,607 (remarks of Sen. George),
13,675-79 (remarks of Rep. Ellenbogen), 13,881 (remarks of Rep. Randolph), 14,138 (remarks of Rep.
Focht).
The Committee on Economic Security gave this summary in 1935:
The Social Security Act, as approved August 14, 1935, represents a major advance in the attain-
ment of economic security for the individual and for his family. The President outlined the entire
program . . . [and] he stated that, "Among our objectives, I place the security of the men,
women, and children of the Nation first." He further said that security for the individual and for
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tives of the Act have not changed since. In 1975, the bipartisan Ad Hoc Ad-
visory Committee on Social Security 40 responded to attacks on the Social
Security system in a paper entitled "Social Security: A Sound and Durable In-
stitution of Great Value. "41 In its paper the Committee echoed Congress'
aspirations and objectives of 1935.42 The policy objectives of the disability pro-
gram have been similarly reaffirmed in a separate Congressional report. 43
Congress has repeatedly condemned delays in the Social Security process,
labeling them a "national disgrace.' '44 According to Congress, delays are "un-
necessary, unfounded; and in addition, . .. a real hardship on those people
who are unemployed due to disability. . . . ,,45 Also, the courts have recognized
that long delays "detract seriously from the effectiveness of the program. "46
Given its broad social objectives, the Act should not be circumvented by
statutory or procedural technicalities. The poverty of disability claimants com-
pounds the importance of the social objectives behind the Act since the poor are
less able to absorb the hardship resulting from the lack of benefits. 47
Second, rule 55(e) is intended to protect the taxpayer. To insure that the
public treasury is not subject to depletion without an affirmative showing that
the claimant is entitled to relief, a claimant must establish his right to relief by
"evidence satisfactory to the court." ' 48 The public must be assured that the
federal government will only pay judgments when a bona fide claim exists. 49
However, default judgments are intended to protect the diligent litigant's
rights. The court must be free to fashion appropriate relief when the judicial
his family concerns itself with three factors . ..(3) safeguards against the major misfortunes in
life. The Social Security Act . .. "safeguards against the misfortunes which cannot be wholly
eliminated in this man-made world of ours." 79 CONe. REc. 14,760 (1935).
40 The Committee is composed of five former Secretaries of H.E.W. and three surviving Social Security
Commissioners.
41 121 CONu. REC. 3822 (1975).
42 "Congress has made clear beyond question its pledge to the American people that the social security
commitment will be honored. The social security system is, in effect, a compact between the people of the
United States and their Government." Id.
43 The Senate Finance Committee minority report, supporting H.R. 7225, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956)
(which Congress ultimately passed to create the disability insurance program), stated:
Under a sound social insurance program, Americans should be protected against the fun-
damental hazards which would otherwise destroy their earning power and reduce them to beg-
gary. Granted that some form of income is necessary to provide for those who are unable to pro-
vide for themselves, it is far preferable that these persons should remain proud, self-sufficient
Americans rather than become in-hand pleaders for public charity.
[1956] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3942.
The intent of the 74th Congress has never been questioned. A survey of every Congress from the 76th
Congress, 1st Session, in 1939 through to the 96th Congress, 2d Session (June 13, 1980), shows that the
legislative intent of the 74th Congress has been reaffirmed. In every Congress since then, numerous bills
have been introduced regarding extension or liberalization of benefits, and expedition of claims and benefit
checks. Also, in 36 of the 42 years between 1939 and 1980, there have been numerous statements of various
Congressmen reaffirming the original policy justifications of the Act.
44 121 CONG. REc. 33,468 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Hefner). See also 121 CONG. REc. 41,877 (remarks of
Rep. Hechler) (delays not in the true American Spirit).
45 121 CONG. REc. 33,468 (remarks of Rep. Hefner).
46 Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1978); White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977).
The Act is intended as a remedial statute and should be liberally construed, interpreted and administered so
it may accomplish the beneficent result intended. See Carroll v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 470
F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1972); Rodriguez v. Celebrezze, 349 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1965). Judicial interpretation is
to be done in the spirit of the legislation. Reyes Robles v. Gardner, 287 F. Supp. 200 (D.P.R. 1968), rev'don
other grounds, 409 F.2d 84 (1969).
47 J. MASHAW, supra note 16, at 1-4; Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9,18 n.16 (1st Cir. 1978).
48 Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962), cert denied, 371 U.S. 975 (1963); see MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30.
49 Rank v. United States, 142 F. Supp. I (S.D. Cal. 1956); MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30.
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process has been halted by an unresponsive party, regardless of that party's
identity. The default judgment provides a necessary sanction against
unresponsive litigants and constitutes a significant tool for enforcing com-
pliance with rules of procedure, as well as for disciplining the adversary who
willfully ignores the orders of the court.50 The diligent party has the right to be
protected from interminable delay.5 1
The Supreme Court has stated that although the default judgment is the
most severe sanction, it "must be available to the district court in appropriate
cases, not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant
such a sanction, but [also] to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct
in the absence of such a deterrent.' '52 The policies underlying the default judg-
ment are: judicial efficiency; the integrity of judicial orders; protection of the
rights of responsible litigants; and the smooth functioning of the adversary pro-
cess.
Although the mandate of rule 55(e) is explicit there are situations in which
a default judgment or its practical equivalent may be entered against the
government without requiring the claimant to establish his right to relief.
These situations arise under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b). 53 When
discovery orders are either disobeyed or ignored, rule 37(b) allows the court to
deem as established designated facts. 54 Courts have approved rule 37(b) sanc-
tions even when the practical result is entry of a default judgement against the
government. 55
The government's obligation to participate in judicial proceedings can be
enforced by sanctions. 56 Regardless of rule 55(e), the same logic should apply
to the government's refusal to follow valid court orders in situations such as
those found in Alameda.
The equity of the statute theory provides that a court may reason by
analogy, as at common law, from one statute to another. 57 Given Congress's
50 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Il. 1979); Bollard v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 569 (W.D. Mo. 1971); 10 0. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE 5 2693 at 307-08, 315 (1973).
51 H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
52 National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per
curiam).
53 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) sets forth various sanctions available to the court to impose when a discovery
order is disobeyed. They are orders (A) that given facts be taken as established; (B) refusing to allow the
disobedient party to oppose designated claims; and (C) striking pleadings or portions thereof. The rule also
allows the imposition of reasonable attorney's fees and reasonable expenses incurred by the responsive
litigant due to the failure to obey discovery orders.
54 In re Attorney General of the United States, 596 F.2d 58, 66 n. 15 (2d Cir. 1979); Reynolds v. United
States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd on othergrbunds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 30, at 322-23; Cf Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 491-92 (5th Cir. 1962) (Rule 55(b) pro-
hibits relieving plaintiff of burden to prove claim against the government where disobeyed discovery order
went to collateral matter). Contra, United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1969); Jackson Buff
Corp. v. Marcelle, 20 F.R.D. 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). If these crucial facts are taken as established, the sanc-
tion order is, in effect, a default judgment since entry of summary judgment in favor of the claimant is a
matter of course. See International Ass'n of Machine and Aerospace Workers v. National Mediation Board,
314 F. Supp. 229 (D.D.C. 1969), re'd on other ground, 425 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
55 Id.
56 National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976); Societe Interna-
tionale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). The willfulness of the failure to comply is, of course, important. If
the failure is due to inability, it violates due process to impose a sanction on any party. United States v.
Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1980).
57 Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, 123 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D. Cal. 1954); See United States
v. Freeman, 44 U.S. 556, 565 (1845); Thorne, The Equity of a Statute, 31 ILL. L. REv. 202, 214-15, 217
(1936); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1908).
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strong legislative mandate in passing the Social Security Act, 58 it is unlikely
that rule 55(e) was intended to circumvent the remedial policies behind the
Social Security Act. The equity of the statute theory would allow a judicial ex-
ception to rule 55(e).5 9 Under the theory a trial court can recognize exceptions
to a statute when it is either inadequate or erroneous as applied to the facts
before the court. Thus, the trial court can create exceptions to the literal re-
quirements of a statute to correct a defect that the legislators themselves would
correct were they present. 60
The legislative intent behind the Act suggests a correction is in order given
the facts and context of Alameda. The costs of delay to claimants in disability
benefits cases are high. Often, retroactive benefit payments are insufficient to
correct the damage caused by delay. 6I For this reason, the Alameda district
court felt justified in having the government and, ultimately, the taxpayer ab-
sorb the unilaterally determined cost of a default judgment. The court believed
the imposition of such harsh sanctions upon the Secretary would deter future
irresponsibility. Also, future claimants would not incur damages like those en-
dured by the claimants in Alameda.62
Although the taxpayers' interests are involved, it should be remembered
that claimants are themselves taxpayers. 63 The social security system's primary
purpose is to allocate to all taxpayers the cost of protecting those who can no
longer provide for themselves. By allowing the district court to set and enforce
reasonable deadlines, the high costs endured by the claimants will be greatly
reduced. 64
Preferably, any case should be decided upon its merits and not by a
The theory gained recognition in the United States in 1891 in Baker v. Jacobs, 64 Vt. 197, 23 A. 588
(1891). The case stated that a specific statute may be extended or retracted to fit a given case not anticipated
by the legislature. This should be especially true when the two statutes are a part of one common scheme.
An argument may be made that the inaction of the Secretary was not anticipated by the drafters of rule
55(e).
58 See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
59 See Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'dsub noma. Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S.
404 (1945); Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
Judge Learned Hand stated:
There is no more likely way to misapprehend the meaning of language-be it in a constitution, a
statute, a will or a contract-than to read the words literally, forgetting the object which the
document as a whole is meant to secure. Nor is a court ever less likely to do its duty than when,
with an obsequious show of submission, it disregards that overriding purpose because the par-
ticular occasion which has arisen, was not foreseen. That there are hazards in this is quite true;
there are hazards in all interpretation, at best a perilous course between dangers on either hand;
but it scarcely helps to give so wide a berth to Charybdis's maw that one is in danger of being im-
paled upon Scylla's rocks.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
60 Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 616 n.15a (2d Cir. 1944); See Cox,Judge Learned Hand and the In-
terpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 370 (1947); But see Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3
VAND. L. REv. 407 (1950) (courts should decide cases in line with the wording of statutes and let the
legislature correct inconsistencies if it so desires).
61 White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 860 (2d Cir. 1977).
62 SeeJ. MASHAW, supra note 16, at 79; Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9, 18 n.16 (1st Cir. 1978).
63 See note 38 supra. In 1977, four out of five people in the 21 to 64 age group had protection under social
security against loss of income due to disability. [1977] U.S. ConE CoNo. & An. NEws 4158. Therefore,
80% of the same taxpayers that are paying this default judgment may well reap the benefits of expedited
claim review in the future.
64 In light of the high percentage of denials ultimately reversed on appeal, reducing unnecessary delays
is an important consideration. During the period of 1970 to 1975, 54% of appealed cases were affirmed,
I 1% were reversed, and 34% remanded. Of those remanded, 65% ultimately resulted in grants. Thus,
about one-third of all disability cases during that period were reversed. This significantly exceeds the court
of appeals reversal rate (19%) of administrative actions generally. J. MASHAW, supra note 16, at 125-28.
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default judgment. This preference, however, is counterbalanced by considera-
tions of justice, social goals, and expediency. 65 The taxpayers may have to pay
an occasional default judgment to insure that the Secretary obeys lawful court
orders directed toward expediting disability reviews. Strict enforcement of rule
55(e) may result in an unresponsive bureaucracy impeding the adversary pro-
cess and circumventing the policies behind the Act. The question is not
whether there will be costs. The question is who will bear those costs. 66 The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should not be used to weaken the Social
Security Act.
Third, although the language of rule 55(e) is clear, authority exists
elsewhere in the rules to uphold the district court's action in Alameda. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1 states that the federal rules "shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." 67 Rule
1 provides a context in which rule 55(e) should be read in analyzing the district
court's order in Alameda. Further, the government should be treated like a
private litigant in remedial reviews to preserve a sense of personal responsibili-
ty in governmental agencies. 68
Personal responsibility was likely a factor in the formulation of the review
provisions of the Act. Appeals from HEW proceedings are "unique" for two
reasons: (1) HEW reviews are made to federal district courts69 rather than to
courts of appeal as is usual in statutory reviews 7 0 and (2) the action is brought
directly against the Secretary. 7t Federal suits requesting review are usually
brought against the particular federal agency or the United States.7 The fact
that the initial appeal is made to the district court is also significant because it
creates an extra step in the review process. This extra step increases the already
lengthy time claimants must wait for adjudication of their claims. Any extra
delay due to bureaucratic irresponsibility should not be tolerated.
The Supreme Court has recognized that blind compliance with procedural
rules is undesirable. In Califano v. Yamasaki,73 the Court held that recoupment
of erroneous overpayments of social security benefits should be waived by the
Secretary should such an adjustment defeat the purpose of the Act or con-
travene equity and good conscience. Lower courts have stated that the Social
65 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: RULES EDITION, § 1217, at 89. The
Secretary's dilatory tactics also contravene the A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969). See
Edestein, Symposium: Qualiy Advocacy and the Code of Professional Responsibility, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1069
(1976). Of the 87 published Local Rules of the United States District Courts, over one-half specifically men-
tion the A.B.A. Code as being in force in that district.
66 See, e.g., White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 859 (2d Cir. 1977).
67 FED. R. Ctv. P. 1.
68 See Bank Line v. United States, 163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947).
69 42 U.S.C. 5 405(g) (1976).
70 B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 430-32 (1976). At least twenty federal statutes provide forjudicial review of agency decisions in the court of appeals in the form of an action against the agency. The
prototype is generally agreed to be § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970). B.
SCHWARTZ, id. at 431; K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 442 (1965).
71 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976).
72 Even under the so-called Urgent Deficiencies Act, which established procedures applicable to review
of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and which provided for such review in a three judge
federal district court, the United States rather than the individual officer was the named defendant. The
anomaly has now been repealed. 28 U.S.C. § 2321 (19.76). The Hobbs Act which, as amended, prescribes
the procedures for review of orders of six agencies in the courts of appeal, nevertheless states: "The action
shall be against the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1976).
73 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
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Security Act's beneficent purposes are not to be circumvented by narrow,
restrictive, or overly technical readings of the Act. 74 The principle should be
equally applicable to interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
connection with social security actions.
The fourth consideration involves evaluation of a court's inherent powers
and the manner in which those powers are used to discharge the duties owed
the litigants and society. There are many benefits of judicial review of social
security cases. Judicial review (1) contributes added accuracy to the claims ad-
judication process; (2) legitimizes the process in the eyes of the interested
public; (3) provides the Secretary with a steady feedback for the agency's self-
improvement; and (4) serves a public information function by providing a
public exposure to an otherwise secretive process. 75 By uncovering problems
arising in the system judicial review also forces continuing congressional
evaluation. 7
6
A court's inherent power to order briefs from litigants to assist in the effi-
cient administration of justice, and dismiss actions sua sponte for a party's
failure to respond to court orders, is well recognized. 77 Regardless of other
strictures, courts have the inherent power to exercise remedial powers if the
Secretary violates the provisions of the Social Security Act. 78 Courts also have a
duty to protect litigants from abuse, harassment, or exploitation. 9 As one
court noted, the statutorily created right of judicial review was not meant to be
uncritical "rubber stamping" of administrative action.80 Courts must main-
tain current dockets to allow for expeditious review of all claims. Neither
litigant should be allowed to interfere with the expeditious review of benefit
claims by protracting the proceedings unnecessarily. In one recent social
security case, in refusing to set aside a default judgment entered against the
claimant, the court stated:
If the instant motions [to set aside the default judgments entered] were
granted, the unacceptable practices which have led to the current situations
would be encouraged. In denying the motions, the Court is of the view that
the prejudice to the [claimants], although real and regrettable, is outweighed
by the benefits which redound to other litigants when the court is able to pre-
vent the propagation of unacceptable practices and inefficiencies and, thus,
able to maintain a current docket.8
This reasoning should apply equally to the government should it default. The
74 See Barnes v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1972): Pasquale v. Cohen, 296 F. Supp. 1088
(D.R.I. 1969), appeal dismissed 418 F.2d 627 (1969); Taylorv. Ribicoff, 196 F. Supp. 774 (W.D.S.C. 1961);
See also Comment, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 396, 405 (1980) (non-technical reading of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 is appropriate since it is a remedial statute).
75 J. MASHAW, supra note 16, at 136-37.
76 Id.
77 Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949);
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924); Ownby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Luis C. Forteza e
Hijos, Inc. v. Mills, 534 F.2d 415, 419 (lst Cir. 1976); 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, at
1041. Although the cases cited do not involve the government as a litigant, the powers are still recognized.
78 White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 860 (2d Cir. 1977).
79 Chatmon v. Churchill Trucking Co., 467 F. Supp. 79 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
80 Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1969).
81 Kostenbauder v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 71 F.R.D. 449, 453 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
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federal courts have thus recognized that society as a whole must bear the price
of governmental misconduct. 8 2
While the First Circuit sympathized with the predicament of both the
district court and the claimants in Alameda, it considered itself bound to follow
the strictures of rule 55(e), section 4 05(g), and prior case law. Although the
First Circuit's action represented a fair interpretation of the law, the district
court's order should have been upheld. The important social policies behind
the Act; the policy objectives behind the Federal Rules; the equity of the statute
theory; and the inherent powers and duties of the court, all suggest that a
judicial exception to rule 55(e) is appropriate in disability benefit
proceedings. 83
Thomas James Salerno
82 . For an illustration of this principle in the criminal sphere, see the Supreme Court's discussion in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961), invoking this principle tojustify applying the exclusionary rule to
the states.
83 As of this writing, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico has reversed the
Secretary's decision in the Santiago case. The district court complied with the evidentiary standard mandated
by the First Circuit in reaching its decision.
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